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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In December 2017, the Oxford English Dictionary named ‘youthquake’ 
as its ‘word of the year’,1 referring to the events at the UK General Election 
earlier that year. The OED (2017) described a youthquake as ‘a significant 
cultural, political, or social change arising from the actions or influence of 
young people’. Although this decision created some controversy – over 
the issue of voter turnout – we show in this book that 2017 was indeed a 
transformative election: one in which youth turnout returned to levels not 
seen since the early 1990s; one in which age replaced class as the most 
important predictor of voting intention; one in which we witnessed a 
resurgence in youth activism in (some) political parties; and, one in which 
the cultural values and economic priorities of Young Millennials dramati-
cally altered the British political landscape.
For over twenty years, scholars have lamented the decline in youth 
turnout in British general elections. The same could be said for many 
other established democracies. Our own research has identified significant 
changes in youth political participation (Henn and Foard 2014; Sloam 
2014). It has noted the disillusionment of young people with electoral 
politics, which is particularly acute in the UK. Yet, during the course of 
our research, we were always struck by the interest of young people in 
political issues. In each of our various research projects, we have been 
reminded that younger citizens are  – in the words of Pippa Norris 
(2002) – ‘reinventing political activism’. The 2017 youthquake in the UK is 
2testament to our belief in the vibrancy of young people’s politics and has 
led us to reflect more deeply on the manifestation of youth politics in an 
era of economic and political turbulence.
There has been a long-term generational trend away from electoral 
politics. Younger cohorts have turned away from political parties and elec-
tions, but have become more active in issue-based forms of participation, 
such as signing a petition, participating in a consumer boycott and joining 
in a demonstration. Since the turn of the new Millennium, new technolo-
gies have enabled a further proliferation of youth engagement into a vast 
array of non-institutionalized, online activities. In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, young people in many countries have utilised social media 
to express their outrage at growing social and intergenerational inequali-
ties in society.
The 2017 General Election demonstrated that young people will 
engage in electoral politics if the conditions are right. The turnout of 
18–24 year olds surged from around 40% in the first decade of the new 
millennium to well over 50% in 2017 (Ipsos MORI 2017; Curtice and 
Simpson 2018). And, the generational differences in support for the two 
main parties were also the largest on record. Two thirds of 18–24 year olds 
voted for the Labour Party compared to just one third in 2010. Why did 
these dramatic changes take place? What was it about Labour under Jeremy 
Corbyn that proved so attractive to younger voters? And, what can this tell 
us about recent and future trends in political participation in the UK and 
beyond?
The book investigates the reasons behind the youthquake from both a 
comparative and a theoretical perspective. It compares youth turnout and 
party allegiance over time and traces changes in youth political participa-
tion in the UK since the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis – from 
austerity, to the 2016 EU referendum, to the rise of Corbyn – up until the 
election in June 2017. The situation in the UK is also contrasted with 
developments in youth participation in other established democracies, 
including the youthquakes inspired by Barack Obama in the United States 
(2008) and Justin Trudeau in Canada (2015).
We support the view that the individualisation of values and lifestyles 
means that today’s young people see politics and politicians quite 
 differently to previous generations. Part of the story lies in the growth of 
postmaterialist values and identity politics, which has led to the emergence 
of new cultural cleavages. Theoretically, we address the work of Norris 
and Inglehart (2018) and others on the increasing significance of cultural 
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3issues since the financial crisis. We portray the young people in the UK 
who supported Remain in the EU referendum and Corbyn in 2017 as 
young left-cosmopolitans, who – despite their lack of trust in politicians and 
political parties – became engaged in electoral politics.
The book also examines differences in electoral participation amongst 
Young Millennials (those who were born between the early 1990s and the 
turn of the century). In particular, we look at how an individual’s social 
class, level of educational attainment and educational status, gender and 
ethnicity can strongly influence their participation or non-participation in 
electoral politics. For example, young people with low levels of educa-
tional attainment were much more likely to vote for Brexit than their 
peers. Young women were considerably more supportive than young men 
of the Labour Party in 2017.
There is a significant body of work that explores the political participa-
tion of citizens of all ages in the wake of the ongoing global financial crisis. 
However, much of this work has focussed on the rise of populist parties 
and movements, as well as the decline of mainstream political parties. 
Despite the large volume of work that has been produced on youth protest 
movements (from the Arab Spring, to the Spanish indignados, to Occupy) 
and the intense scrutiny of the Obama youthquake in 2008, there are few 
existing studies of the electoral attitudes and behaviour of younger cohorts 
(or their underpinning values and policy preferences) during this period.
This book helps to fill this gap in the literature. It is partly a response to 
the dramatic events of June 2017 in the UK, but more precisely a longer- 
term study of youth political participation before and after the onset of the 
2008 global financial crisis, and the emergence of new patterns of political 
participation in established democratic systems.
From Democratic Decline to Youthquake
Although the extent of the decline in electoral participation amongst 
younger generations varies widely across Europe and North America, the 
trend towards disillusionment and disengagement with political parties 
and politicians has been unmistakeable (Fig. 1.1). In the United States, 
the turnout of 18–24 year olds in presidential elections fell from 51% in 
the 1960s to an average of around 40% since the 1980s. In the UK, youth 
participation averaged around 65% between the 1960s and the early 
1990s, but suffered a collapse in engagement thereafter. Elsewhere in 
Europe, the drop in youth turnout in established democracies was not as 
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4steep. Germany is a typical case in point. The Federal Republic experi-
enced only a gradual decline in youth electoral turnout despite the higher 
levels of voter apathy in its new Eastern states after re-unification. These 
mostly proportional systems nevertheless witnessed a serious ebbing away 
of support for catch-all parties amongst younger cohorts. In Germany, for 
instance, the share of 18–24 year olds voting for the Christian Democrat 
(CSU/CSU) and Social Democrat (SPD) parties fell from 90% in the 
1970s (compared to 94% of all adults) to 74% (81% of all adults) in the last 
pre-unification election in 1987, to only 43% (53% of all adults) in the 
2017 Federal Election (Federal Returning Officer 2017).2
The distancing of citizens from political parties was captured by Russell 
Dalton and Martin Wattenberg in their seminal text, ‘Parties without 
Partisans’ (2002), which recorded the process of voter dealignment in 20 
OECD countries. In Europe, established political parties experienced a 
sharp decline in membership after the 1980s. According to Van Biezen 
et al. (2012), party membership fell by 68% in the UK, 53% in France, 47% 
in Sweden, 36% in Italy and 27% in Germany between 1980 and 2009.
The UK has been noticeable not just for its very low levels of youth 
turnout – which seem to be a particular feature of first-past-the-post elec-
toral systems  – but also the large gap between the participation of the 
youngest cohort of voters and that of the electorate as a whole between 
2002 and 2012 (Fig.  1.2). The ratio of youth engagement (between 
18–24 year olds and adults of all ages) is just 0.51, compared to an average 
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Fig. 1.1 Youth electoral turnout in the United States, the UK and Germany 
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5of 0.73  in eight other European democracies and 0.64  in the United 
States. This suggests to us that the reduction in youth electoral participa-
tion in the UK cannot simply be attributed to long-term trends. It marked 
a generational rupture, or ‘period effect’, amongst those coming of age 
from the early 1990s onwards.
These negative trends in electoral participation spawned a number of 
pessimistic studies that expressed concern about the negative impact of 
youth disengagement on democratic citizenship. However, there are radi-
cal differences between academic authors in how they account for this 
disengagement. Robert Putnam, in ‘Bowling Alone’ (2000) and other 
work, linked the decrease in engagement amongst younger citizens to a 
broader fall in the membership of traditional associations, such as trade 
unions and churches, and a general decline in social capital and trust. This 
version of events is hotly contested, since it deals with changes in young 
people’s attitudes and engagement (demand-side factors) but largely 
ignores changes to the supply of politics. In short, society has evolved, but 
political parties and party systems have struggled to adapt. Not all pessi-
mists have laid the blame for low turnout on younger citizens. Several 
alternative explanations point to the changing nature of politics and 
policy- making over recent decades. These include claims about the effects 
of voter dealignment (see above) and the lowering of the voting age from 
21 to 18 in the 1960s and 1970s (Franklin 2004). Other important factors 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Sweden Netherlands Austria Germany
Italy Greece Spain EU Average
US Portugal UK
Fig. 1.2 Rates and ratios of youth participation in EU9 countries and the United 
States, 2002–2012. (Sources: European Social Survey, US Census)
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6considered include the ‘hollowing out’ of political parties (Mair 2013) 
and the ‘outsourcing’ of policy-making from representative democracy to 
expert groups, international bodies and even financial markets (Fawcett 
et al. 2017).
These pessimistic accounts of (youth) political participation have been 
challenged by a second body of research that focuses on what young peo-
ple do rather than on what they do not do. These studies adopt broader 
definitions of what qualifies as political action, and tend to look at trends 
in participation across several democracies (as opposed to single country 
case studies). Pippa Norris (2002, 2004) was amongst the first to provide 
a counter-narrative to Putnam’s explanation of declining civic and political 
engagement. She depicted a ‘Democratic Phoenix’ wherein younger 
cohorts are rewriting the rules of the game through increasing participa-
tion in non-electoral forms of politics, such as petitions and boycotts. 
These changes are partly explained by the switch in citizens’ political 
objectives from politics to policy. For instance, issues such as climate change, 
global poverty, or free higher education might be more easily pursued 
through pressure group membership (such as joining Greenpeace), con-
sumer action (including buying fair trade products) or joining a demon-
stration (such as the British anti-tuition fees rallies, 2010/2011), rather 
than by long-term membership of traditional political organisations. In 
these accounts, voting remains pivotal within the context of an increasing 
diversification of youth political participation.
Whether existing studies are pessimistic or optimistic about the quan-
tity and quality of young people’s politics, they generally accept that young 
people’s motivations for political engagement differ from those of older 
generations and previous generations of young people. We are particularly 
impressed by Amnå and Ekman’s (2014) notion of the ‘stand-by citizen’ – 
that young people increasingly engage in politics on a case-by-case basis, 
when an issue is relevant to their everyday life. This may be an issue that 
challenges an individual’s sense of collective identity (such as the  opposition 
of young Muslims to Western foreign policy in the Middle East), or some-
thing that has a tangible bearing on one’s economic future (perhaps the 
availability of low-cost housing), or on one’s leisure pursuits in a local 
community (such as the threat of closure to a local park or youth centre). 
This conceptualization of a stand-by citizen adds a temporal component to 
political engagement, emphasizing the importance of the timing and the 
duration of political action. It is not that engagement in institutionalized 
and formal electoral politics does not take place, but that it has become 
increasingly contingent upon the resonance of an issue.
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7To our minds, the optimistic accounts of young people’s politics have 
become even more persuasive in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. 
The dominance of austerity politics and the rise of authoritarian- nationalist 
forms of populism (from the UK Independence Party to Donald Trump), 
has led to the politicization of Young Millennials. The day-to-day eco-
nomic concerns of younger citizens have become more pressing in light of 
falling living standards. And cultural or postmaterial issues, such as envi-
ronmental protection, national identity and immigration, have become 
more contentious and prominent. These dual crises resulted in a perfect 
storm of discontent amongst young people, many of whom participated in 
an international wave of political protest in both liberal and illiberal 
democracies: from demonstrations against rising university tuition fees in 
London, to Occupy Wall St. in Manhattan, to rallies against transport 
costs in Rio de Janeiro, to protests against the infringement of political 
freedoms in Istanbul, to occupations of public squares by the Spanish 
Indignados (‘the outraged’) to combat political corruption and youth 
unemployment across Europe.
This politicization of young people has manifested itself in greater 
scepticism about politicians and political parties in general, but also – 
on occasion – through greater engagement with the political process. In 
many countries, this has led to large increases in youth support for 
political parties that are socially liberal and economically ‘left-wing’ 
(offering, for instance, support for greater state intervention). In sys-
tems with proportional representation and in places that have been 
worst hit by the financial crisis, new parties have emerged from the mar-
gins to meet these challenges. This was the case for PoDemos in Spain, 
which was formed in 2014 off the back of the Indignados protest move-
ment.3 In first-past-the- post systems, the increase in cosmopolitan-left 
sentiment has led to challenges to the leadership of existing centre-left 
parties. Jeremy Corbyn and Bernie Sanders were both successful in 
attracting the youth vote (despite being old, white, men) to the British 
Labour Party and in the 2016 US Democratic primaries, respectively. In 
all three examples, they profited from the engagement of legions of 
enthusiastic young activists who were able to ignite grass-roots support 
for their parties or candidate.
It is also true that the radical nature of cosmopolitan-left parties and 
candidates can put off older voters, and might ultimately limit their sup-
port and chances of gaining power. Here, the cases of Barack Obama in 
the United States (2008) and Justin Trudeau in Canada (2015) are 
instructive. In economic terms, they both positioned themselves more to 
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8the centre ground than the three previous examples. Although the first 
Obama administration injected huge sums into the economy in the imme-
diate aftermath of the financial crisis, and managed to introduce a (much 
watered-down) healthcare programme, OECD figures record that US 
public spending (as a proportion of GDP) barely altered between 2008 
and 2016 (OECD 2017). Obama’s achievements regarding cosmopolitan 
values and international outlook were more impressive. These included 
halting the deportation of young undocumented immigrants who met the 
criteria laid down in the Dream Act, and a commitment to international 
targets for the reduction of greenhouse gases at the 2015 Paris Climate 
Accord. Trudeau’s Liberal-led Government has similarly paid more atten-
tion to injecting social liberalism into Canadian politics – for example, the 
welcoming of refugees from Syria and efforts to legalize marijuana – than 
to traditional left-wing objectives. The support of the Obama and Trudeau 
administrations for international free trade deals (such as those initiated 
with the European Union) is more akin to the Clinton-Blair brand of pro-
gressive politics than that of Sanders, Corbyn and PoDemos (who are 
naturally suspicious of the role of international markets and financial 
institutions).
Youthquakes anD Young cosmopolitans
Over the last two decades the word ‘youthquake’ has been used by politi-
cal commentators, and more occasionally by academics,4 to describe seis-
mic political activity that seems to be inspired by younger citizens. But the 
term has never, to our knowledge, been adequately explained. We appreci-
ate the broad nature of the OED definition (cited earlier in this chapter), 
which refers not only to significant changes in electoral politics, but also to 
the underlying social, economic and political forces that precipitate these 
changes. We would add that ‘youthquake elections’ are ones in which dra-
matic changes in how many young people vote, who they vote for and how 
active they are in the campaign have, quite literally, shaken up the status quo.
To qualify as a youthquake, we therefore believe that an election must 
meet one or more of the following criteria: increased turnout amongst 
young people; a decisive shift in youth support for a political party or the 
emergence of a new party attracting widespread youth support; or, a sig-
nificant increase in the volume or intensity of youth political activism. To 
explain why youthquake elections happen and what the consequences 
might be, we then have to look at the broader economic, social and political 
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9dimensions identified in the OED definition. In this respect, we would 
stress the importance of value change amongst younger generations and 
the impact of the financial crisis on young people’s everyday lives as being 
of primary importance. In our view, the spike in youth turnout in the 
2017 UK General Election, the unprecedented levels of support of 18–24 
year olds for the Labour Party, and the high levels of youth activism associ-
ated with the Labour Party’s strong performance, provide one of the 
clearest recent examples of such a landmark vote.
In this study, we focus on 18–24 year olds. Although it could easily be 
argued that this age range is too narrow, it refers to a distinct cohort of 
young people who are (mostly) voting in their first national election. 
Our range of survey data (of 18–24 year olds from 2002 to 2017) maps 
on to the standard definition of the Millennial Generation – those born 
between 1981 and 2000. And, since young people are most open change 
at this point in their lives and electoral participation is known to be 
habit- forming (Franklin 2004), we consider this to be the most signifi-
cant stage in an individual’s formal political development. It is the point 
at which an individual’s decision to vote and to support a particular 
political party are most likely to have a lasting impact. However, we rec-
ognize that age more generally plays a key role, as values and behaviours 
that are typical of 18–24 year olds are also likely to be found (if to a 
lesser extent) amongst 25–34 year olds and 35–44 year olds. Indeed, this 
ripple effect is a feature of both long-term generational change and 
short-term period effects.
It  is important to remember, when examining these events, that 
young people are not all the same. In their book ‘Voice and Equality: 
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics’, Sidney Verba et  al. (1995) 
highlighted the role of resources in determining whether an individual 
became civically or politically engaged. In this respect, a citizen’s level of 
educational attainment and educational status are the strongest predic-
tors of whether they participate or not in the electoral process. Education 
is more than a proxy for social class. With respect to higher education, 
students accrue resources from being in higher education – through the 
density of social networks and opportunities for civic and political 
engagement on campuses – and from the likelihood that they will acquire 
more political knowledge than the average young person. In the United 
States, Sander and Putnam’s (2010) revision of Putnam’s earlier work 
recognizes the growing gap between highly engaged college students and 
relatively disengaged non-college-bound-youth. This effect is observable 
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(albeit to different degrees) in all established democracies. And, it leads 
to a broader question about the extent to which voting is affected by 
one’s socio- economic status, gender and ethnicity. So, however transfor-
mative a youthquake may be, there are always groups of young people 
that do not belong to these events. In this regard, the book also explores 
the extent to which authoritarian-nationalist forms of populism have 
become attractive to young outsiders  – most commonly young men of 
low socio-economic status.
Despite these caveats, we contend that the emergence of cosmopolitan- 
left values and political engagement characterize recent developments in 
youth political participation, and include support for social liberalism and 
the redistribution of state resources, but also scepticism towards main-
stream electoral politics. Young cosmopolitans are particularly prominent 
in the UK. Here, we emphasize the importance of tracing youth political 
trends across time – from Occupy to Corbyn, noting the temporal and 
cyclical nature of youth engagement.5 We also stress the need to provide 
both youth-centred (demand-side) and system-level (supply-side) per-
spectives (Hay 2007) if we are to fully capture the dynamics of young 
people’s politics.
organisation oF the Book
Chapter 2 begins with a review of existing theories of youth electoral par-
ticipation and political participation more generally. We separate the litera-
ture into theories that deal with the implications of socio-economic 
change, those that emphasize changes in the nature of the political system, 
and those that pay greater attention to (youth) political activism.
The analysis of the existing literature highlights the central role of edu-
cation (educational attainment, educational status and knowledge about 
politics), identity (including, gender, ethnicity, nationhood) and commu-
nication (for example, patterns of news consumption and the efforts of 
political actors to engage with young people). It also identifies the policy 
areas prioritised by younger cohorts, which (later in the book) are com-
pared with and contrasted to policy programmes and campaign strategies 
of mainstream parties in general elections and the Remainers and Brexiteers 
in the 2016 EU referendum.
The chapter then sets out our conceptualisation of ‘young left- 
cosmopolitans’. We argue that a combination of economic stagnation, 
high levels of educational attainment, and rapid social change, have 
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resulted in a historically distinct cocktail of political engagement and 
resentment, and the emergence of a large, young group of cosmopolitan- 
left citizens in the UK (and many other established democracies). These 
developments explain the widespread youth engagement at the 2016 EU 
referendum and the 2017 General Election, and youth support both for 
Britain remaining in the European Union and of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour 
Party. Building on the recent work of Norris and Inglehart (2018) we 
assert that young people’s politics is defined both by material interests 
(which became more pressing in the aftermath of the 2008 financial  crisis), 
but also by an outward-looking cosmopolitanism and acceptance of cul-
tural diversity.
This conceptualization of young, cosmopolitan-left citizens applies to 
most, but not all, young people. Cosmopolitan-left individuals are likely 
to hold university degrees, to be in full-time education, female, and live in 
an urban environment. Conversely, young, white males with low levels of 
educational attainment are least likely to possess these views.
Chapter 3 investigates young people’s attitudes towards, and engage-
ment in, electoral politics before and after the onset of the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Drawing upon two representative surveys of 18 year olds 
conducted in 2002 and in 2011, it explores how youth perceptions of 
politics, participation rates and political preferences vary by age, gender, 
ethnicity, level of educational attainment and educational career trajectory. 
It also considers how political attitudes and engagement are shaped by 
political knowledge, trust and a sense of confidence in one’s ability to act 
and in the effectiveness of this activism in achieving change.
Using the theoretical framework outlined above, the chapter also iden-
tifies the economic and cultural issues that are prominent in young peo-
ple’s politics, and explores how attitudes, engagement, policy preferences 
and political allegiances have been affected by the financial crisis. And, it 
looks at the extent to which British political parties have attempted (or 
neglected) to engage with young people through an analysis of 
Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat manifestos and voter mobili-
sation strategies for the 2001 and 2010 general elections.
Chapter 4 begins by exploring the relationship between public attitudes 
towards European integration and the rise of authoritarian-nationalist 
populism and cosmopolitan ideals in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. 
Afterwards, it presents the results of a representative survey of youth atti-
tudes and engagement in the 2016 British EU referendum. At the same 
time, we also examine the platforms of the Remain and Leave campaigns, 
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to evaluate the extent to which each were willing or able to articulate and 
address young people’s concerns and interests. The analysis finds that 
three quarters of young people supported Remain in the referendum 
despite their lack of trust in the very political elites that fronted the Remain 
campaign. Chapter 4 also drills down into the composition of the youth 
vote according to demographic factors, knowledge, trust and efficacy. 
Young university students were particularly likely to engage in the referen-
dum campaign and to vote Remain.
The chapter focuses on the interplay between economic and cultural 
reasons for supporting British membership of the EU. It finds that young 
people’s support for EU membership was less to do with any sense of 
European identity, and much more do to with their relative acceptance of 
cultural diversity and European integration, and their fears of the negative 
economic consequences of a potential Brexit (in an era of austerity and 
falling living standards for younger cohorts).
Chapter 5 draws upon another of our surveys as well as freely available 
polling data, to explore youth attitudes to, and engagement in, the 2017 
General Election, which led to a seismic change in youth participation: an 
increase in turnout and mass support for the Labour Party amongst Young 
Millennials, reaching up to all cohorts under 45, which denied the 
Conservative Party a majority in the new House of Commons. According 
to Ipsos MORI figures (2017), a remarkable 62% of 18–24 year olds voted 
for the Labour Party, contrasting with 27% for the Conservative Party. 
The highest levels of support for Labour came from young black minority 
ethnic citizens, young women, and young people of a low social grade.
Chapter 5 also examines the supply side of politics in more depth. It 
assesses the success of Corbyn’s team in mobilizing young people  – 
through the work of Momentum as well as the appeal of Corbyn himself. 
We also analyse the drawing-power of the 2017 General Election manifes-
tos of the Conservative Party, Labour and the Liberal Democrats – and the 
extent to which each was able to communicate a substantive policy pro-
gramme for younger citizens.
We conclude by again highlighting the emergence of young cosmopolitan- 
left citizens, and what this means for the future of British democracy and 
other established democracies. We account for the resurgence in youth 
activism in the following ways. First, the redistribution of resources away 
from younger citizens and youth-oriented public policy after 2010 has 
persuaded more young people to favour increased public spending in 
areas such as health and education. Second, cultural differences across 
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generations have deepened. Young people are much more approving of 
cultural diversity, more welcoming of European integration, and much 
less concerned about immigration than older generations.
Here, we reflect again upon the success of the Corbyn in appealing to 
younger voters, but also on the efforts by the Conservative Party (after the 
2017 General Election) to widen their appeal amongst those cohorts. 
After decades of neglect by the political class, this has the potential to 
inspire a virtuous circle of engagement by political actors in youth- oriented 
policy and greater participation of younger voters in electoral politics. 
Nevertheless, it is far from certain whether mainstream political parties 
will be able to capitalize, beyond Corbyn, on this increase in youth engage-
ment in electoral politics.
notes
1. The Guardian, 9 June 2017, ‘The Youth for Today: How the 2017 Election 
Changed the Political Landscape’, https://www.theguardian.com/poli-
tics/2017/jun/09/corbyn-may-young-voters-labour-surge
2. Whilst the new states of the united Germany certainly contributed to greater 
voter volatility, the trend away from the catch-all parties was already clearly 
observable in the 1980s.
3. PoDemos sprung from the Indignados’ protests against austerity and politi-
cal corruption (led by the 36 year-old politics lecturer, Pablo Iglesias) to 
become Spain’s third largest party within 20 days of its formation.
4. Al-Momani (2011) uses ‘youthquake’ in relation to the Arab Spring, and 
Goodwin and Heath (2016) refer to its use in the media after the 2017 
General Election. More interestingly, Stephen Mintz (2006) examines the 
phenomenon over time when analysing the impact of youth activism on 
post-1945 US politics.
5. Rather strangely, the cyclical nature of youth electoral participation (over 
time) is largely neglected in the electoral studies literature, but more devel-
oped in the study of protest movements and ‘contentious politics’ (Tilly and 
Wood 2015).
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CHAPTER 2
Rejuvenating Politics: Young Political 
Participation in a Changing World
In the introduction, we demonstrated that youth participation in electoral 
politics has declined in recent decades, albeit at different rates and at dif-
ferent times in different democracies. The large, mainstream catch-all par-
ties, founded on cleavages of blue-collar and white-collar workers, do not 
reflect the reality of our postindustrial societies. This partly explains the 
process of ‘voter dealignment’ – the weakening of collective ties between 
citizens and political parties. Furthermore, the total share of the vote for 
catch-all parties, such as the Conservatives and Labour in the UK and 
Christian Democrats and Social Democrats in Germany, has eroded dra-
matically during this period.
One reason for optimism regarding youth participation, is that young 
people continue to engage in ‘politics’ (broadly understood) despite their 
relative lack of enthusiasm for politicians and political parties. European 
Social Survey data reveal that young people in the UK are as interested in 
politics as their peers elsewhere in Europe, despite the slump in youth 
voter turnout after the early 1990s (Sloam 2016). This suggests that the 
problem is less to do with a general lack of political engagement and more 
to do with the disconnection between young people and the political 
system.
Further evidence is provided by the growth in non-electoral and 
non- institutionalized forms of political engagement over several decades. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005), for example, showed how levels of 
18
participation in petitions, boycotts and demonstrations doubled in the 
UK and the Federal Republic of Germany (and increased by around a 
third in the United States) between the 1970s and the 2000s. Dalton 
(2017: 93) similarly argues that, if we include other actions such as 
contacting local government, protest, petition signing, political con-
sumerism and online participation, ‘the contemporary US public dis-
plays a substantially higher level of activity than in the 1960s’.
Figure 2.1 illustrates how aggregate rates of youth participation in peti-
tions, boycotts and demonstrations (just three of the many non-electoral 
forms of participation) today far exceed aggregate rates of voting in 
national elections and political party membership. This is the case in the 
United States, the UK and the six other established European democra-
cies  – France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden  – 
included in Wave 5 of the World Values Survey. In the UK, 18–24 year 
olds were almost twice as likely to participate in these non-electoral forms 
of political action than they were to vote or be a member of a party. It is 
also worth adding that citizens do not have the opportunity to vote in 
parliamentary or presidential elections every year – indeed, they have taken 
place on average once every two or three years in the eight countries in 
Fig.  2.1.1 By contrast, World Values Survey data shows that in 2011 
around a third of young Americans, young Swedes and young Germans 
had signed a petition multiple times during the previous 12 months alone.
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When large, established political parties have prospered amongst 
young people in recent times, they have usually done so by electing a 
leader who is perceived to be more authentic or through the adoption of 
a radical policy programme. With regard to cosmopolitan-left politics, 
the Labour Party in New Zealand achieved a double-digit increase in its 
share of the vote in 2017, in an election that saw a 7% increase in youth 
turnout and about two thirds of 18–30 year olds voting for Labour 
(New Zealand Herald, 20 September 2017). This youth support for 
Labour, with its most interventionist agenda in decades, helped to pro-
pel 37-year-old Jacinda Ardern to the prime ministership at the head of 
a Labour-led coalition government. However, in the same year, the 
31-year-old Sebastian Kurz (of the conservative  People’s Party) was 
elected as Chancellor of Austria. His anti-Islamic campaign was founded 
on the reassertion of ‘Austrian values’ and opposition to immigration. 
The People’s Party, together with the far-right Freedom Party, captured 
the support of 58% of 18–30 year olds and two thirds of young men with 
low levels of educational attainment (SORA 2017). The unexpected suc-
cess of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 US presidential 
race illustrated (even more starkly) the rise of radical, anti-establishment 
candidates. In all these cases, the resurgence of cultural politics, whether 
authoritarian- nationalist or cosmopolitan in character, has been evident. 
We would add to this list,  the 2016 EU referendum and the 2017 
General Election in the UK.
This chapter provides a theoretical account of young people’s politi-
cal engagement in the UK and other established democracies. It begins 
by outlining the changing social, economic and political conditions for 
engagement. These include the increasing prominence of identity poli-
tics, austerity in public spending since the start of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, and the role of new media in facilitating political 
engagement. Afterwards, it looks at agent-centred theories that account 
for Young Millennials’ attitudes towards, and participation or non-par-
ticipation in, various forms of politics. We proceed by highlighting the 
cultural turn – the emergence of postmaterialist politics and conten-
tious cultural issues over recent decades. Finally, the chapter fleshes out 
the cosmopolitan character and leftward drift of youth politics in con-
temporary Britain and other democratic systems. Here, we present our 
own conceptualisation of young cosmopolitans in an era of economic 
and cultural conflict.
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Shifting tectonic PlateS
Over several decades, the tectonic plates that shape and sustain democratic 
participation have shifted. The changes have been economic, social, cul-
tural and political in nature, and are all interlinked (see Fig. 2.2, below).
Between the 1960s and the 2000s, postindustrial democracies experi-
enced a prolonged period of economic growth, increasing levels of educa-
tional attainment, a reconfiguration of the labour market, and the 
loosening of traditional norms regarding religion and family life. As a 
Economic & Social Change
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Fig. 2.2 Trends in young people’s politics
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result, transitions from youth to adulthood have become delayed and stag-
gered (Arnett 2004; Furlong and Cartmel 2007; Flanagan 2013). Young 
people stay in education longer, enter full-time employment later, and 
marry and have children at an older age than was the case in previous 
decades. In the European Union, the number of 15–24 year-olds still in 
education rose from 49% in 1987 to 58% in 1995 to 68% in 2007, and the 
median age for a young person entering the workforce rose from 18 to 20 
during the same period (European Commission 2008). In the United 
States, the proportion of 20 year olds who were married fell from 79% to 
22% between 1967 and 2014 while the proportion of young men in work 
by this age fell by half (Dalton 2017: 92). Smets (2012) shows that these 
changes have profound implications for political participation – countries 
with more heterogeneous maturity patterns have larger disparities in vot-
ing between older and younger citizens.
Young Millennials have more opportunities than previous generations, 
but also face greater risks than their predecessors (Beck 1992; Furlong and 
Cartmel 2007). Structural changes in the labour market mean that there 
is no longer any real prospect of a job for life (Goodwin et al. 2017; Bessant 
2018), whilst the breakdown of traditional social mores has led to identi-
ties that are shaped by fluid categories of class, community, ethnicity and 
culture (Bauman 2000). These developments have led to the individual-
ization of values and lifestyles and the growth of identity politics. Young 
people must constantly reinvent themselves economically and socially  – 
from their CVs to their Facebook profiles  – within a network society 
(Castells 2015). When citizens do engage, they increasingly participate in 
personally meaningful causes guided by their own lifestyles and shifting 
social networks (Norris 2002; Bennett and Segerberg 2013).
Another central dynamic in postindustrial economies and societies is 
globalization, which Held (2003: 516) describes as the ‘growing inter-
connectedness and intensification of relations among states and societies’. 
This process has involved a sharp increase in the volume of international 
trade and financial transactions, and of multinational companies. In a glo-
balized and globalizing world, individual outlooks, behaviours and feel-
ings can transcend local and national boundaries (Held 2003). And, ‘it is 
through engagements with various forms and representations of the global 
[from international markets to the European Union] that cosmopolitan, 
or anti-cosmopolitan values surface and find expression’ (Woodward et al. 
2008: 210). Indeed, cosmopolitanism is often defined as the acceptance 
of and adaptation to globalization, whilst religious fundamentalism, 
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nationalism, and ethnic and territorial identities are often depicted in 
opposition to this process (Beck 1996; Castells 1997).
Political action is increasingly centred around everyday issues that chal-
lenge citizens’ identities, and can bubble-up with great speed and inten-
sity. Black Lives Matter, for example, emerged as a national movement in 
the United States in 2014 in response to cases of police brutality against 
mainly black men (such as that of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri) 
and immediately struck a chord with civil rights groups across the country. 
In October 2017, #MeToo encouraged women to record their experi-
ences of sexual assault in the wake of the Harvey Weinstein scandal. Within 
two months, the #MeToo status had been posted on Facebook 100 mil-
lion times across more than a hundred countries. In February 2018, a 
mass shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida, led to the 
establishment of a survivors’ group supporting tighter gun controls under 
the hashtag #NeverAgain. This grew into a nationwide movement push-
ing for gun controls and calling for action against politicians and compa-
nies associated with the National Rifle Association. The resulting ‘March 
for Our Lives’ rallies on 24 March 2018 attracted hundreds of thousands 
of young people across the country.
Physical location remains important for young people’s politics: in fos-
tering a sense of identity, in offering spaces to practice democratic skills, 
and in providing symbolic locations (such as city squares and university 
campuses) for political action (Weller 2003; Hopkins and Todd 2015). 
However, the sheer diversity of the Millennial Generation, coupled with 
the rise of new communication technologies has led to the reformation of 
communities across traditional territorial boundaries, so that political 
action has become increasingly channelled through social networks across 
‘hybrid public spaces’ (Castells 2015). In this respect:
A person may make use of diversity in order to create a distinctive self- 
identity, which positively incorporates elements from different settings into 
an integrated narrative. Thus, a cosmopolitan is precisely one that draws 
strength from being at home in a variety of contexts. (Giddens 1991: 88)
Conversely, greater diversity has also provoked an authoritarian-nationalist 
reaction, leading to the retreat of those who feel threatened by these 
changes into national, regional and religious identities.
As we have already noted, different democracies have quite different 
patterns of political participation. We can observe large variations even 
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across similar democratic systems. For example, youth voter turnout in the 
UK was approximately 40% for the four elections between 2001 and 2015, 
compared to 80% in Sweden during the same period (Sloam 2016). In 
France and Spain there is a strong tradition of youth participation in pub-
lic demonstrations. In the UK, it is more common for a young person to 
sign a petition than in most other European countries. In the United 
States, young people are very active in community projects (Dalton 2017). 
However, as we pointed out in the introduction, there has been a worry-
ingly large gap in the UK between the electoral participation of younger 
people and older generations.
Nevertheless, there are trends that are common to all these countries 
(Fig. 2.2, above). As we previously argued, the representative capacity of 
mainstream politicians and traditional political institutions has weakened 
significantly in recent decades. At the same time, the growth of issue- 
based lifestyle politics has supported a transition from politics to policy, 
whereby citizens, politicians and government officials have together 
shifted ‘the emphasis from democratic participation to good governance’ 
(Bang and Esmark 2009: 18). On the one hand, this can be viewed as a 
positive development, increasing opportunities for citizen interaction with 
policymakers through small scale democracy (Goul-Anderson and 
Roβteutscher 2007). On the other hand, the belief of many political rep-
resentatives in the logic of deregulation of public services and the depoliti-
cization of policy-making has led to the outsourcing of policy to expert 
bodies, international institutions and even international markets (Burnham 
2001; Held 2003; Hay 2007). This, in turn, has helped fuel the rise of 
managerialism in politics.2 Considering these developments, there is also a 
tendency to view citizens as customers rather than democratic citizens. As 
a result, public consultations can easily become instrumentalized. 
Chadwick and May (2003) show, for example, how e-democracy was 
transformed from being perceived (by politicians) as a tool of democratic 
participation to being viewed as an instrument for efficient government 
(providing cheap and convenient online services).
The economic risks for young people from all social groups have been 
exacerbated by the recent financial crisis (Fig.  2.2). In most countries, 
youth unemployment increased considerably in the five years after 2008, 
whilst jobs have also become more precarious (Verick 2009; Erk 2017). In 
those countries worst affected by the sovereign debt crisis, such as Greece 
and Spain, youth unemployment surpassed 50% (OECD 2015). Moreover, 
austerity in public spending has placed a disproportionate burden on the 
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young (Willetts 2011). The Intergenerational Foundation (2016) has 
demonstrated how intergenerational inequalities have increased in the UK 
due to the long-term pressures of an ageing population (such as the bur-
geoning of public sector pensions liabilities) and a further economic 
squeeze on Millennials since 2008: including, a 10% cut in real terms 
spending on education between 2010 and 2016, the stagnation of wages, 
the rising costs of housing, and the trebling of university tuition fees in 
2012.
We should also remember that an individual’s position and progress in 
society are not only determined by their cognitive and social skills (though 
they do play an important role), but also by their economic class, gender 
and ethnicity (Furlong and Cartmel 2007). These factors can affect 
whether a young person is invited to a job interview (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003), how they are treated by official authorities, and the 
barriers or opportunities for their entry into representative politics. These 
intragenerational inequalities are particularly acute in the UK, Italy, France 
and the United States, which have the lowest levels of social mobility 
amongst advanced OECD economies (OECD 2015). This clearly matters 
for youth political participation given what we know about the key role of 
economic resources in determining whether or not an individual partici-
pates in politics (Verba et al. 1995).
theorieS of Youth ParticiPation
In the introduction we outlined competing claims regarding youth politi-
cal participation. A number of authors have lamented the decline in youth 
voter turnout and engagement in key social and political institutions. 
Robert Putnam’s (2000) Bowling Alone is perhaps the best-known exam-
ple of this work. Another branch of the literature has pointed to the pro-
liferation of youth participation across a vast array of alternative, 
non-electoral and non-institutionalized forms of engagement. Pippa 
Norris (2002) has, thus, conceived of political participation as a Democratic 
Phoenix, evolving to adapt to new political, economic and social realities.
What is certain is that young people’s perceptions of politics and reper-
toires of engagement have changed. Political participation is increasingly 
viewed through the lens of individual action frameworks, whereby ‘formal 
organizations are losing their grip on individuals, and group ties are being 
replaced by large-scale fluid social networks’ (Bennett and Segerberg 2012: 
748). These networks form the basis of alternative modes of political 
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engagement that seem to better fit younger citizens’ preferences for hori-
zontal forms of engagement. For example, it is much more attractive to 
sign an online petition, forwarded by a friend, on online ‘snooping’ by the 
state, than to actively promote the broad programme of a top-down 
organisation like a political party.
Earlier in the chapter, we recognised the transition from politics to 
policy as a fundamental change in modern democratic politics. Amnå and 
Ekman (2014) make some important arguments about the temporal 
nature of issue-based participation. In their study of young people in 
Sweden, they identified ‘four faces of political passivity’: an ‘active’ group 
with high levels of interest and participation (6% of the sample); ‘standby’ 
citizens with high interest and average participation (45%); an ‘unen-
gaged’ group with low levels of interest and average participation (27%); 
and, ‘disillusioned’ citizens with low participation and low interest (22%) 
(Amnå and Ekman 2014: 274). So, just under half of young Swedes can 
be described as standby citizens, who ‘stay alert, keep themselves informed 
about politics by bringing up political issues in everyday life contexts, and 
are willing and able to participate if needed’ (Amnå and Ekman 2014: 
262). This has implications for our understandings of why young people 
turn out to vote in transformative elections. It suggests that many young 
people will turn out to vote when they can identify with the issues empha-
sized by a candidate or party – a point reinforced by evidence from Henn 
et al. (2017).
If the Millennial Generation is primarily concerned with issue-based 
engagement, the outsourcing of public policy (within the context of glo-
balization) helps to explain why today’s young people target a more 
diverse range of political, economic and social actors than previous genera-
tions. Individual (young) citizens might simultaneously support issues and 
causes across several geographical planes – for example, by campaigning 
for better recycling in schools and colleges, while at the same time being 
an active member of an international environmental organisation such as 
Greenpeace.3
Yet, within the context of globalization and the individualization of 
values and lifestyles, young citizens also wish to anchor themselves to ide-
ological or values-based parties, movements and candidates. According to 
Spannring and her colleagues (2008: 73), ‘the managerial approach shared 
by most politicians does not offer young people ideals and values with 
which to identify’. The preference for issue-based engagement and the 
desire for politicians and causes in which they can believe, together pose 
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an immense challenge for political parties. To connect with young people, 
these parties must emphasize and communicate policies that young people 
are interested in, whilst at the same time providing them with an authentic 
set of values or ideology with which they can identify (Henn and Foard 
2014). Electoral youthquakes are the consequence of a political party or 
candidate meeting this challenge.
After the onset of the financial crisis, we experienced an initial surge in 
youth participation in non-electoral forms of politics, motivated by frus-
tration and anger with the politicians and public policy and facilitated by 
recent advances in communications technologies. The Internet and social 
media have enabled a dramatic speeding up of political mobilisation by: 
acting as a real-time filter for alternative politics, where only the most reso-
nant ideas – such as ‘The outraged young’ and ‘We are the 99%!’ – rise to 
the surface; and, radically reducing communication costs for participation 
(Bimber et al. 2005). During this wave of youth protest we have witnessed 
the emergence of a new ‘logic of connective action… based on personal-
ized content sharing across media networks’ (Bennett and Segerberg 
2012: 739). This perfect storm of political outrage and readily available 
new technology facilitated the engagement of many young people into 
social movements, such as Occupy and the Spanish Indignados, with a 
cosmopolitan-left core. This, in turn, laid the seeds for their participation 
in the electoral process where and when the conditions were right.
Web 2.0 and social media have also become important features of elec-
toral politics. First, they have dramatically altered how young people learn 
about politics. Comparative research across 36 countries by the Reuters 
Institute (2017) found that the proportion of adults using social media as 
a news source almost doubled (from 23% to 46%) between 2013 and 
2017. Nearly two thirds (60%) of 18–24 year olds used online sources or 
social media as their main source of news (46% used Facebook to obtain 
political information) in 2017 compared to only 28% of over 55s.4 The 
research also revealed that just under a quarter (24%) of young people 
used TV as their primary source of political news, compared to one half 
(51%) of over 55s. Interestingly, for our study of young cosmopolitans, the 
report also shows that, in certain countries (including the UK, the United 
States and Italy), new news media have a socially liberal and economically 
left-wing political orientation.
These new communication technologies are also increasingly utilised 
by political actors. The 2008 Obama campaign for the US presidency pio-
neered the use of the Web 2.0 and social media in elections. The Obama 
 J. SLOAM AND M. HENN
27
team maximized the potential of email, text messaging and social network-
ing sites to spread their message, raise money and mobilize supporters. In 
doing so, they established a nationwide virtual network of over three mil-
lion contributors in less than 12 months (Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 
2011). The campaign, thus, empowered mainly younger citizens to 
engage their friends and family in Obama’s bid for the presidency. And, 
the organic growth of the ‘Students for Barack Obama’ Facebook group 
was ‘so effective at energizing college-age voters that senior aides made it 
an official part of the campaign’ (Vargas 2008: 2). As we shall see in Chap. 
5, this bears a resemblance to the communication strategy of the Labour 
Party in the run-up to the 2017 General Election. The use of non- 
traditional media and horizontal forms of citizen-to-citizen engagement 
was a vital ingredient in attracting young people to the Labour cause – 
especially given the negative portrayal of Jeremy Corbyn in the main-
stream media.
Whilst the existing literature on youth political participation does a 
good job in explaining new trends, it often neglects the social inequalities 
of participation.5 There are many young people who are not politically 
engaged or active. And, these young people tend to come from poorer 
backgrounds, to not go on to higher education, and to leave school with 
few, if any, qualifications. This large segment of the youth population 
tends to be – in Amnå and Ekman’s (2014) terms – disillusioned and dis-
engaged. Schlozman et al. (2010), thus, depict the Internet as ‘the weapon 
of the strong’, noting the digital divide in online participation. And, evi-
dence suggests that young people who engage in non-electoral forms of 
politics are usually the very same individuals who also engage in electoral 
politics. Those disengaged or disillusioned young people are, in direct 
opposition to young cosmopolitans, likely to react negatively to the per-
ceived threats of cultural diversity and immigration. When they do, on 
occasion, become engaged in politics, these young outsiders are often 
attracted to authoritarian-nationalist values and causes. The National 
Front (FN) in France is an example of a far-right party that has been very 
successful at appealing to this demographic (Lubbers and Scheepers 
2002). The FN gathered 6% of the youth (18–24 year old) vote in the first 
round of the presidential election in 2007, 18% in 2012 and 21% in 2017 
(Martin 2017). In the second round run-off of the 2017 French 
Presidential Election, Marine Le Pen, the FN Leader, gained 44% of the 
youth vote compared to 20% of over 65s (The Independent, 1 May 2017).
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the riSe of PoStmaterialiSm
So far in this chapter, we have considered a range of debates and an array 
of empirical data that, when combined, point to the importance of eco-
nomic, social and political changes in shaping young people’s political val-
ues, engagement and participation across a range of contemporary 
postindustrial societies. We have also argued that these developments and 
processes have impacted on different groups of youth in different ways.
The underlying causes of these trends are much debated. One promi-
nent theory which seeks to account for citizens’ (of all ages) apparent 
disconnection with formal politics, their shifting values and their increas-
ing rejection of mainstream parties and their concerns about the limita-
tions of existing democratic processes, is Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis 
(Inglehart 1971; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). According to this theory, 
citizens’ political values are profoundly impacted by their adolescent expe-
riences, particularly by the material circumstances prevalent during any 
particular period – ‘period effects’ as opposed to long-term generational 
effects. Where pre-adult socialization occurs under conditions of relative 
economic austerity, people’s values will tend to focus on immediate mate-
rialist concerns, emphasizing economic and physical security. Such citizens 
are likely to be attracted to policies geared towards low inflation, employ-
ment growth, immigration control and law and order. In contrast, where 
those socialization experiences are gained during times of relative eco-
nomic prosperity, citizens will be pre-disposed towards postmaterialist 
preferences, valuing quality of life issues such as political and expressive 
freedoms, environmental sustainability and global social justice. They will 
also be increasingly disenchanted with the limits of existing democratic 
arrangements, and instead be drawn toward alternative and transformative 
politics (Inglehart 1997) including looser non-institutional forms of polit-
ical participation created from below (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002).
The value of Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis has been the subject of 
significant debate, and its theoretical claims have been tested in numerous 
studies, including a small number that consider youth in Britain (Majima 
and Savage 2007; Sloam 2007; Theocharis 2011; Rheingans and Hollands 
2013; Henn et al. 2017). Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that postmaterial value change is gaining momentum, globally. 
Indeed, all eight of the EU15 countries studied by Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005) became much more postmaterialist between 1970 and 2000, and 
postmaterialist values are found to be particularly advanced within younger 
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generations. Figure 2.3 indicates that even during the austerity conditions 
ushered in by the 2008 global financial crisis, postmaterialist values 
remained evident amongst a noticeable minority of young people in 
Britain – although as expected, numbers have fallen from the more eco-
nomically secure environment of a decade earlier.
The endurance of postmaterialist values – even under current austerity 
conditions – is significant, because postmaterialists tend towards lifestyle 
politics, and are much more likely than materialists to engage in non- 
electoral forms of politics such as signing a petition, joining a boycott and 
participating in a demonstration (Copeland 2014; Stolle et  al. 2005). 
What is more, the long-term spread of postmaterialist values has created 
new cultural cleavages to rival the old postindustrial (materialist- economic) 
ones. The emergence of new social movements and political parties from 
the libertarian left and the authoritarian right have made the political land-
scape more complex.
However, there are large variations across these postindustrial coun-
tries. In many, the increasing prominence of postmaterialist values has led 
to the rise of alternative political parties, resulting in the participation of 
Green parties in several European governments (Muller-Rommel and 
Poguntke 2013). In the United States, it has led to the rejuvenation of 
political campaigning for socially liberal candidates (as illustrated by youth 
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Fig. 2.3 Materialist, postmaterialist and ‘mixed’ value preferences of young 
Britons (19 year olds), 2002–2011 (%). (Source: Henn and Weinstein 2003; Henn 
and Foard 2012)
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political activism in the Obama and Sanders campaigns) and a significant 
increase in collective political action for local causes (Dalton 2017). Young 
Britons, without the same opportunities for engagement, have become 
more involved with volunteering or charity work and direct action 
(Birdwell and Bani 2014).
Henn et al. (2017) use Inglehart’s four-item materialist-postmaterialist 
scale to compare the values and political participation preferences of 
British young materialists, postmaterialists and those who hold intermedi-
ate or “mixed” views, during periods of relative economic prosperity and 
of economic insecurity. It supports Inglehart’s claims (2016) that, even 
under the austerity conditions of the current global recession, the 
materialist- postmaterialist cleavage retains importance – this is evident in 
terms of young people’s political values, and particularly so with respect to 
their political participation.
Henn et al.’s results (2017) indicate that during periods of both eco-
nomic affluence and scarcity, postmaterialists are considerably more likely 
than other young people to feel dissatisfied with the way that democracy 
works in their country. Indeed, they are especially critical of the practice of 
electoral politics and are keen supporters of proposals to reform the first- 
past- the-post system to break the hegemony of the traditional mainstream 
parties, and to back emergent parties. Interestingly, although young post-
materialists in the UK seem particularly sceptical of the value of institu-
tionalized electoral politics, they are significantly more likely than their 
contemporaries to consider voting in future elections, whether national, 
European or local. They are also the most likely youth group to engage in 
party politics by activities trying to convince someone else how to vote, 
donating money to a political party, or working for a political party during 
an election campaign. This seems somewhat contrary to Inglehart’s thesis 
that postmaterialists would be especially frustrated by the limits of existing 
electoral methods. However, it might instead be argued that their willing-
ness to vote perhaps reflects the fact that postmaterialist youth will turn to 
any form of political action available that offers them the means to chal-
lenge austerity politics in the UK.
Less surprising is that young postmaterialists are more interested in 
non-institutionalized and extra-parliamentary forms of action than mate-
rialist youth. This fits with the findings of other studies which suggest 
that young postmaterialists are attracted to political action that accords 
with their individuated life-styles and which they consider to be more 
expressive, less hierarchical, more flexible and ultimately more effective 
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(Beck 1992; Furlong and Cartmel 2007; Busse et al. 2015; Soler-i-Marti 
2014; Tormey 2015). These range from low impact activities such as 
discussing politics with family or friends through to more demanding 
activities such as involvement in community associations, charity groups 
or youth forums, participation in protests, rallies or demonstrations, or 
working with other people to address a public issue or tackle a particular 
social problem.
The data also indicate that young postmaterialists are particularly toler-
ant of others who engage in extra-parliamentary actions, and see the use 
of such methods of political participation as having potentially greater 
value and efficacy than voting in elections. For instance, they were much 
more likely than other young people to agree with the notion that people 
should be allowed to organise public meetings in protest against the gov-
ernment. Furthermore, they consider that getting involved with cam-
paigning and single issue pressure groups (such as Greenpeace) provides a 
more effective means to influencing the government than being active in 
a political party. Interestingly, young postmaterialists also expressed sup-
port for people who use direct action to change the political world. Again, 
such styles of political participation are considered to have considerably 
more value than parliamentary-focussed activities.
In all of these areas, the distinctiveness of young postmaterialists is 
noticeably more evident for those socialised under conditions of ‘aus-
terity’ (the 2011 cohort) than those who reached the age of attainment 
under the significantly more affluent circumstances in the early years of 
the new Millennium (the 2002 cohort). This would seem to run coun-
ter to Inglehart’s thesis that postmaterialist values and outlooks would 
be most evident amongst young people socialised during periods of 
relative economic security, and support recent claims that young 
Britons have been radicalised by their experiences of austerity politics, 
and are choosing to embrace alternative styles of political action. We 
will develop this idea in the next section when we consider the rise of 
young cosmopolitans – a group of leftist-oriented youth who in many 
respects mirror Inglehart’s postmaterialists in that they express particu-
lar dissatisfaction with existing democratic processes and institutions, 
and are increasingly drawn to new transformative agendas and visions 
for change.
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Young coSmoPolitanS
Our conception of young cosmopolitans builds upon the work of Norris 
and Inglehart (2018), emphasizing the cultural turn, which so distin-
guishes Millennials from older generations, but also the leftward drift that 
is particularly prevalent amongst many young people in countries which, 
like the UK, experienced a prolonged period of austerity after 2008.
Norris and Inglehart (2018) write of the increasing importance of a 
cultural axis in contemporary liberal democracies – from populism, con-
servatism and nationalism at one end, to cosmopolitan liberalism at the 
other end. Whilst the left-right economic axis remains significant, they 
argue that the emergence of this cultural cleavage has accelerated over the 
past ten years since the onset of the global financial crisis Norris and 
Inglehart (2018). In the UK context, Sanders and Twyman (2016) divide 
the electorate into four ‘tribes’: ‘liberal left’, ‘liberal centre-right’, ‘centrist- 
moderate’, and ‘authoritarian-populist’.
The book focusses on these cosmopolitan-liberal and liberal left groups – 
referred to here as the ‘cosmopolitan left’ – who Sanders and Twyman 
(2016: 4) claim represent 37% of all British adults and 43% of 18–29 year 
olds. The cosmopolitan-left incorporates a leftist belief in state intervention 
to address economic inequalities and provide well-funded public services 
(including free education), and a cosmopolitan belief in human rights, 
outward-looking and inclusive societies, and a relatively relaxed attitude 
towards immigration (Young Cosmopolitans 2018; Sanders and Twyman 
2016: 3). We would emphasize, in the UK context, this group’s positive 
attitudes towards cultural diversity and European integration. In the fol-
lowing empirical chapters, we therefore investigate the existence of mate-
rialist and postmaterialist values amongst young people (before and after 
the onset of the financial crisis), and youth support for both social liberal 
and economically redistributive policy programmes.
Efforts to categorise emerging political and cultural cleavages are not 
without their critics (Bean and Papadakis 1994; Duch and Taylor 1994). 
The aggregation of individuals into broad groups may overlook important 
intra-group differences. Moreover, axes of political and cultural values 
may gloss over the nuanced realities of anti-establishment parties and 
movements. Young people may, for example, advocate protection of the 
environment, but favour tough action against terrorism. And, the 
cosmopolitan- left in Greece and Spain tends to be Eurosceptic – given the 
tough austerity measures imposed by the EU. But the same group in the 
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UK was overwhelmingly supportive of European Union membership in 
the 2016 referendum. So, national political and social contexts are crucial 
in determining how cosmopolitan-left values translate into political action. 
In the empirical sections of the book, we are sensitive to these structural 
factors.
The question of ethnic diversity and how countries should integrate 
different cultures and traditions has become a central feature of electoral 
politics. As our societies have become more open and diverse  – and in 
response to terrorist attacks carried out by ‘home-grown’ Daesh-inspired 
individuals and groups – resistance to cosmopolitan values has also grown. 
Mainstream, usually centre-right, politicians have attempted to tap into 
this authoritarian-nationalist sentiment in order to outflank populist 
movements and parties. In late 2010 and early 2011, David Cameron, 
Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel (then, Prime Minister of the UK, 
President of France and Chancellor of Germany) all decried the failure of 
multiculturalism in their respective countries.6 According to Sarkozy: ‘We 
have been too concerned about the identity of the person who was arriv-
ing and not concerned enough about the identity of the country that is 
receiving him’ (Daily Telegraph, 11 May 2011). What these statements 
mean in practice is open to interpretation.
These political interventions on the subjects of immigration and 
national identity fuelled a public debate in many countries about the future 
of cosmopolitanism. Jeremy Cliffe (2015), in a paper for Policy Network, 
addressed this theme directly from a liberal perspective. He argued that 
Britain was becoming more like London: its citizens were increasingly 
diverse, highly educated, urban, socially liberal, and possessing an interna-
tional outlook. Cliffe’s point that greater ethnic diversity will inevitably 
bring about a greater preponderance of cosmopolitan values may appear 
naïve to some, given the rise of UKIP and the EU referendum result (Ford 
and Goodwin 2014) as well as the conservative values of some immigrant 
groups (Katwala 2015). He nevertheless captured the essence of many 
Young Millennials, who, though outnumbered by older citizens, have 
become increasingly prepared to defend these values in the political arena.
After the EU referendum and the decision for Brexit, it was widely 
assumed that anti-cosmopolitan or populist-nationalist rhetoric would be 
politically useful in gaining the support of Leave voters. Prime Minister 
Theresa May’s address to the 2016 Conservative Party Conference 
attacked political and economic elites as ‘citizens of nowhere’ (Daily 
Telegraph, 5 October 2016). Although this strategy succeeded in  attracting 
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back many voters to the Conservatives from UKIP, it also turned many 
socially liberal, pro-EU, younger voters towards Labour. Jeremy Corbyn 
was able to capitalize on this sentiment through his liberal credentials on 
cultural diversity and immigration, despite his ambivalent views on the EU 
expressed during the referendum campaign.
In many countries, young adults have proved to be more resistant to 
authoritarian forms of populism than older citizens. In these places, they 
are likely to possess socially liberal and economically left-wing attitudes 
and values, and favour movements that set themselves apart from the 
political mainstream and protest against what is perceived to be a neo- 
liberal or corrupt political establishment. Elsewhere, there is evidence to 
show that economically disadvantaged young people are particularly sus-
ceptible to authoritarian-nationalist values, candidates and parties (Foa 
and Mounk 2017).
In this book, we demonstrate that the cosmopolitan-left orientation of 
young people is particularly widespread in the UK, but also relevant to a 
large segment of the youth population in other European democracies and 
in North America. From an international perspective, we note that young 
cosmopolitans vary in their adherence to economically left-wing attitudes 
according to the economic circumstances of the country or region in 
which they live. For example, Justin Trudeau’s success with younger vot-
ers in Canada was much more to do with his socially liberal persona than 
any radical economic policies.
In the UK, we account for the resurgence in youth activism and 
cosmopolitan- left orientations in the following ways. First, the redistribu-
tion of resources away from younger citizens and youth-oriented public 
policy over the past ten years has persuaded more young people to favour 
state intervention and increased public spending. Second, cultural differ-
ences across generations have deepened. Young people are more approv-
ing of cultural diversity, more welcoming of European integration, and 
less concerned about immigration than older generations.
Cosmopolitan values apply to many, but not all, young people. As we 
demonstrate later in the book, cosmopolitan-left individuals are very 
likely to hold university degrees, and to be students and women. 
Conversely, old, white males with low levels of educational attainment are 
least likely to possess these views. It is hardly new to state that young, 
highly- educated citizens are open to cosmopolitan values. Inglehart and 
colleagues have made this argument for several decades (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005). Our claim is that young cosmopolitans have crystalized into 
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a distinct and coherent political force, united by their common values and 
common positions on postmaterial issues such as Brexit, immigration and 
the environment, and material issues such as healthcare, housing and edu-
cation, and in opposition to the authoritarian-nationalist forms of popu-
lism characterized by UKIP, Donald Trump and elements of the British 
Conservative Party. We also observe that the differences between younger 
and older voters are greater in cultural than in economic issues.
SummarY
In this chapter we have considered the relationships between young citi-
zens and democratic processes and institutions in a variety of postindus-
trial societies. In particular, we have noted that these relationships are 
beset by stresses that often result in young people withdrawing from 
parliamentary- oriented politics, as evidenced by reduced rates of voting 
and a generalised lack of appetite for engaging with mainstream political 
parties.
Pessimistic observers have concluded that such developments reflect an 
on-going and irreversible trend that is leaving representative democracies 
lacking broad societal support, and consequently in danger of losing their 
legitimacy. However, many have noticed that while today’s youth seem to 
be abstaining from formal politics, they are increasingly attracted to alter-
native styles of politics such as petition signing, protesting, political con-
sumerism and online activism. In large part this is because these methods 
appear to be especially valuable in helping them to actualise their political 
hopes and ambitions. Young people also seem to be increasingly open to 
the charms of new political candidates, parties and movements emerging 
from beyond the mainstream. These political outsiders often focus on 
issues of immediate relevance and concern to young people – and they also 
offer bottom-up and participative campaigning approaches that are par-
ticularly appealing to youth.
We have also examined various approaches and theories that seek to 
account for these patterns of youth political engagement and democratic 
participation. One approach considers a number of structural changes that 
have occurred since the 1960s and which have fused together to create 
opportunities, but also considerable risks and uncertainties, for young 
people. Extended and complex transitions into adulthood prompted by 
dramatic changes in the organisation of education and of labour markets, 
increasing levels of geographic mobility that reduce connections and 
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engagement within neighbourhoods, as well as powerful globalising 
forces. These processes have combined to problematize young people’s 
life-courses and transform (or obstruct) their routes into democratic life.
More youth-centred approaches focus on the extent to which young 
people’s experiences of politics – and of the professional political elite – 
shape their democratic values, orientations and participation. In particular, 
recent government austerity programmes have coincided with a deepen-
ing rift between young citizens and formal politics in many countries. 
Outraged at having to bear the brunt of these regressive social and eco-
nomic policies, young people have increasingly embraced new technolo-
gies to mobilise opposition to these attacks on their living standards. 
However, the patterns of youth political engagement and political partici-
pation are socially uneven. Whereas many socially disadvantaged ‘left- 
behind’ youth are susceptible to the rhetoric of authoritarian-nationalist 
movements and parties, highly educated and middle-class youth are often 
attracted to cosmopolitan, anti-austerity and leftist forces. In many 
respects, these contemporary left-facing cosmopolitan youth were antici-
pated by Inglehart in his postmaterialist thesis. Characterised by a general 
dissatisfaction with the practice of democratic politics and a deep antipathy 
towards the political class, they are attracted to individualised, life-style 
and cultural politics and are interested in moral issues such as environmen-
tal sustainability and global social justice. In the next chapter we will con-
sider the factors underpinning young people’s patterns of political 
engagement and political participation in the early years of the new 
Millennium, and identify fundamental social, political and cultural shifts 
that have contributed to the shaping of the current Youthquake.
noteS
1. Over the ten years between January 2008 and December 2017, there were 
two national elections in Sweden, three in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy 
and the UK, four in Spain and France (including two presidential elections), 
and eight in the US (including three presidential elections).
2. Schmidt (2006) argues that the transfer of powers to the European Union 
has led to a situation where we have policy without politics at the EU level, 
and politics without policy at the national level. Mair (2006) claims that this 
process has resulted in a ‘hollowing out’ of representative politics in Europe.
3. Charles Pattie et  al. (2004) demonstrate how widespread micropolitical 
engagement with regard to policy on schools, the health service and in the 
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workplace. However, it has also been discovered that these contact activities 
are even more dominated by older, male and well-off citizens than is the case 
with voting (Sloam 2013).
4. In a few places, including Germany, traditional media – TV and newspa-
pers – retain their strong position as trusted and well read news sources, and 
new news media have failed to make the same headway as in the UK and the 
United States.
5. Accounts of the social inequalities of political participation can nevertheless 
be found in studies of citizen participation amongst all age groups. Verba 
et  al. (1995) published the seminal text on this topic. Russell Dalton’s 
(2017) book, ‘The Participation Gap: Social Status and Political Inequality’, 
updates these arguments.
6. In early 2011, other notable centre-right politicians, including former 
Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, and former Spanish Prime 
Minister, Jose Maria Aznar, made similar statements regarding the supposed 
failure of multiculturalism.
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CHAPTER 3
The Silent Revolution in Youth Political 
Engagement
The 2001 General Election marked a turning point in UK electoral poli-
tics. The dramatic decline in youth turnout led to the characterization of 
young people as, at best, apathetic abstainers, with little or no interest in 
democratic affairs. With respect to national elections, voter turnout prior 
to 2001 was a relatively stable affair; between 1945 and 1997, the mean 
turnout was 76% and varied on average by less than 4% between elections. 
However, in 2001, the landslide return of a Labour government was over-
shadowed by a collapse in electoral participation across the country. As 
Fig. 3.1 indicates, only 59% of the eligible electorate voted, down from 
71% at the previous election in 1997 and falling to the lowest turnout rate 
since 1918 – an outcome interpreted by some as representing a ‘crisis of 
democratic politics’ (Harrop 2001; Whiteley et al. 2001). Although turn-
out increased in subsequent UK general elections, these changes were 
marginal, reaching only 61% in 2005 and 65% in 2010 – far short of the 
post-War average.
However, these headline turnout figures masked important patterns of 
electoral inequality. Many urban constituencies of high socio-economic 
deprivation, such as Liverpool, Leeds, Manchester and Glasgow, regis-
tered less than 45% turnout (UK Political Info 2018). Other social lines of 
difference were also apparent, as the unemployed, those from social classes 
C2 and DE, those living in the privately rented sector and those from 
British minority ethnic groups were each estimated to have voted in 
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considerably lower numbers than their contemporaries (Ipsos MORI 
2001; Electoral Commission 2002). These patterns of electoral inequality 
were broadly repeated at the general elections of 2005 and 2010 (Ipsos 
MORI 2005, 2010).
Age was also one of the strongest predictors of voter turnout. The 
extent of youth abstention from the polls was particularly apparent in 
2001, with only 39% of 18–24 year olds voting, falling further to 37% in 
2005 (Henn and Foard 2012) (see Fig. 1.1, Chap. 1). Although there was 
a slight increase to 44% in 2010, by that time a discourse for youth politics 
of the new Millennium had become visible, largely centring on what 
young people were not doing – that they were failing to demonstrate an 
interest in formal politics (Park 2004) and were avoiding electoral politics 
(Russell et al. 2002).
However, a small number of studies published at that time challenged 
that analytical focus as well as the characterisation of youth political 
engagement and political participation that emerged from it. Authors 
claimed that such a representation of youth was based largely on a narrow 
conception of politics that failed to fully appreciate that young people 
were interested in matters that were essentially political in nature, even if 
they themselves did not articulate them as such (Henn et  al. 2002; 
O’Toole et al. 2003). Furthermore, evidence suggested that young peo-
ple were increasingly turning towards a variety of alternative political 
actions (Roker and Eden 2002), including ‘cause-oriented’ (Norris 2003) 
and ‘micro- political’ activities (Pattie et al. 2003). These new repertoires 
of political participation have been driven by underlying values change. 
50
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Fig. 3.1 UK general election turnout 1945–2010 (%). (Source: UK Political 
Info 2018)
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As we shall see, Inglehart and Welzel (2005) attributed these develop-
ments to the rise of postmaterialist values in postindustrial democracies.
In this chapter, we consider patterns of youth political engagement and 
political participation in Britain between the 2001 and the 2010 General 
Elections, and observe a relatively stable level of interest in politics and 
importantly, a support for democracy that has endured over the period as 
the global economy has moved into deep recession. Nonetheless, we also 
identify an ongoing and deep antipathy towards the political class which 
may have repercussions in terms of the future weakening of the connec-
tion between young citizens and formal democratic institutions and pro-
cesses – and ultimately the long-term viability of representative politics in 
the UK. Whilst this anti-political sentiment is present in younger genera-
tions in many other established democracies, the level of youth engage-
ment  – in comparison to older citizens  – is far lower in the UK (see 
Fig. 1.2, Chap. 1).
Using two unique datasets (Henn and Weinstein 2003; Henn and 
Foard 2012), we seek out explanations for why these young Britons 
seem on the one hand to be sceptical of the value of elections and of the 
motives and performance of elected representatives, while on the other 
hand they seem genuinely attracted to new ‘issue-based’ agendas and 
alternative styles of politics. We also reveal that patterns of youth politi-
cal engagement and political participation are not uniform. There is a 
tendency in much of the research to treat young people as a homogenised 
group, and in many respects that practice reflects a lack of large-scale 
studies of this demographic (as small samples prohibit the use of many 
statistical tests when conducting sub-sample analyses). However, as we 
are able to draw upon large samples of youth, this allows us to examine 
the interplay of several underlying factors considered to be associated 
with, and shaping, young people’s political opinions, preferences and 
behaviours, including social class, gender, ethnicity and educational 
career. We are also able to assess the extent to which alternative value 
systems may have a bearing on youth politics. In particular, we address 
how new cultural cleavages – specifically, Inglehart’s materialist-postma-
terialist cleavage  – are replacing these socio-demographic variables as 
the key drivers of young people’s political engagement, and if these help 
to explain the emergence of young cosmopolitans and the unfolding 
youthquake.
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Youth Political (Dis-)EngagEmEnt: PartiEs Fail 
to connEct
Explanations advanced for the apparent decline in youth participation in 
electoral politics are varied, and there is considerable disagreement as to 
the underlying causes. Hay (2007) usefully articulates the sources of this 
ongoing youth disaffection by offering ‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side’ 
explanations. According to this, the demand for politics is rooted in peo-
ple’s changing values and outlooks. In particular, the rise of a more 
informed and critical citizenry (Norris 2011) who are increasingly frus-
trated with the limits of contemporary representative politics (Tormey 
2015)  – especially the under-performance of professional politicians 
(Whiteley 2012) – and are often pre-disposed towards more postmaterial-
ist or cosmopolitan outlooks (Norris and Inglehart 2018). We shall dis-
cuss this in the second part of this chapter.
In contrast, supply-side explanations suggest that formal politics has 
failed to attract successive youth cohorts, not least because the policy con-
cerns of young people are given little priority by politicians. For instance, 
Hart and Henn (2017) have claimed that in recent decades, mainstream 
parties in Britain have tended to coalesce around a broadly neoliberal phi-
losophy that is committed to economic freedom above political freedom, 
and this has translated into a privileging of laissez-faire economic policies 
and a reduction in state intervention in the economy by successive govern-
ments (Berry 2012; Furlong and Cartmel 2012). As a consequence, the 
discourse and programmes of these parties have converged, offering very 
little in their party manifestos designed to improve young people’s eco-
nomic and social well-being or to champion the policy priorities and aspi-
rations of the country’s youth (Côté 2014; Sloam 2014; Busse et  al. 
2015). Moreover, there have been very few opportunities afforded to 
young people to shape the policy agendas of these political parties (Mycock 
and Tonge 2012), and this has tended to exacerbate the on-going and 
deepening disconnect between young people and democratic politics in 
Britain.
Analyses of the content and rhetoric of election manifestos for the UK 
General Elections of 2001 and 2010 provide insights into the extent to 
which the main national political parties – Labour, the Conservatives and 
the Liberal Democrats – reached out to young people as part of their cam-
paigning. For both of these elections, we assessed the quantity of each 
party’s content that attended to youth-related matters. For this purpose, 
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we counted the number of times that the term ‘Youth’ or youth-related 
synonyms were mentioned as a proportion of the party document.
Table 3.1 summarises the results from these content analyses. They 
indicate that, during the early years of the new Millennium, all parties 
failed to offer a comprehensive, positive and consistent message of reassur-
ance to young people that their concerns, hopes and aspirations would be 
addressed through government policy in the event that they were elected 
to office. These manifestos offered little incentive for young people to 
engage with the elections or to vote. Although the Labour Party men-
tioned young people (or synonyms of that generation) considerably more 
often in their 2001 election manifesto than did the Conservatives, their 
document was significantly larger in word length. When we examine the 
frequency of youth-related terms as a proportion of each manifesto, the 
differences are insignificant. Only 0.11% of the Labour manifesto men-
tioned young people, virtually identical to the Conservatives (0.11%). By 
contrast, the Liberal Democrats referred to young people more than their 
main rivals (0.14%), but again, the extent of the appeal to the youth elec-
torate was negligible. Interestingly, each of the parties gave prominence to 
students (or ‘graduates’) over other young people (Labour 6 out of 35 
mentions, Conservatives 10 out of 15 and Liberal Democrats 10 out of 
29) – a group that has a considerably more middle class base, and is rela-
tively likely to vote compared to the wider youth population.
In addition to the extremely low number of positive references to 
youth, the parties failed to offer substantial sections focussing on youth in 
their respective 2001 manifestos. Labour, as the outgoing party of govern-
ment presented only a single bespoke youth passage, ‘How Labour helps 
young people’ that briefly listed six youth policy statements, including the 
New Deal and increased opportunities in higher education; however, this 
amounted to only 88 words and 0.29% of the manifesto. The Conservatives 
incorporated only a single equivalent youth-centred paragraph, focussing 
exclusively on ‘Reducing barriers for students’ (111 words, 0.84%). The 
Liberal Democrats included a specific section devoted to higher education 
that represented a clear attempt to appeal to young people, ‘Higher 
Education’. However, this amounted to only 262 words and 1.25% of the 
entire document; while they offered other youth-centred policies (includ-
ing introducing voting at sixteen, entitlements to study leave with pay for 
all 16–24 year olds, extending the full Minimum Wage to all those aged 
16 and over), each were dealt with as short headlines without detailed 
discussions.
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Analyses of the manifestos presented by the main national parties at the 
2010 General Election suggested that each had learned relatively little 
from their collective failures to mobilise the youth vote a decade previ-
ously. The number of mentions of ‘young people’ and related terms in the 
Liberal Democrats’ document were exactly the same as for 2001 (29 men-
tions and 0.14% as a proportion of the full manifesto). Arguably, the refer-
ences to British youth in the Labour and Conservative manifestos each 
doubled (35–62 and 15–37, respectively), but again the proportion of the 
overall word count in each was considerably less than half of one percent. 
This reflected a distinct and quantifiable absence of direct appeals to young 
people.
Further examination of the manifestos suggests that youth-targeted 
themes formed a relatively minor aspect of each party’s plans for govern-
ment. The 2010 Conservative manifesto offered a noticeable change in 
tone from 2001, and included several policy appeals to young people. 
These included commitments to tackling youth unemployment, 20,000 
new young apprenticeships, workplace training, the introduction of a 
National Citizen Service, and creating 10,000 additional university places 
by incentivising voluntary early re-payment of student loans. As in 2001, 
the Liberal Democrats again committed to reducing the voting age to 16. 
They also offered two brief bespoke youth-centred passages, to introduce 
a new youth work placement and apprenticeship schemes, and investment 
in Foundation Degrees and Adult Learning Grants. Labour, as the outgo-
ing party of government, also offered brief reference to a small number of 
specific youth-targeted policies such as guaranteed employment for those 
out of work for six months or more, the right to supported housing for 16 
and 17 year olds, a free vote in parliament on reducing the voting age to 
16, and improved citizenship education. They also included a detailed sec-
tion on education, which included raising the education and training leav-
ing age to 18, retaining the Education Maintenance Allowance and a 
commitment that 75% of people would go ‘on to higher education, or com-
pleting an advanced apprenticeship or technician level training, by the age of 
30’.
Taken together, these manifesto analyses indicate a distinct lack of 
engagement with youth policy concerns at both the 2001 and 2010 UK 
General Elections and little effort to directly appeal to young people. This 
evidence lends support to Hay’s (2007) ‘supply-side’ explanation of young 
people’s ongoing withdrawal from electoral politics in general – and of 
voting in particular – in the early years of the new Millennium, as a failure 
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of the parties to connect with young people. Furthermore, young people 
felt frustrated and disenchanted following the election of the Conservative- 
Liberal Democrat coalition government in 2010. In particular, the deci-
sion of Deputy Prime Minister Clegg to reverse his party’s high-profile 
election campaign pledge to abolish university tuition fees and to vote 
instead for a three-fold rise, prompted a wave of anger amongst young 
people, including its manifestation in a nationwide wave of student pro-
tests in 2010 and 2011 (Hopkins et al. 2011). As a direct consequence of 
the Liberal Democrat U-turn on tuition fees and participation in the 
Coalition Government, its share of the youth vote collapsed from 30% in 
2010 to just 5% in 2015  (Ipsos MORI 2010, 2015). The Coalition 
Government’s implementation of a far-reaching austerity programme in 
2010 in response to the unfolding global economic crisis had a dispropor-
tionately negative impact on young people, and served to intensify exist-
ing generationally-based social and economic inequalities (Birch 2013). 
The impact of these policies left many young people feeling ignored and 
marginalised, contributing to their deepening mistrust of, and antipathy 
toward the political class, and a continued withdrawal from electorally- 
oriented politics (Henn and Foard 2014), and pushed those young people 
who did turn out to vote to switch to the Labour Party in 2015 and 2017 
(see Chap. 5).
Youth Political aPathY or EngagED scEPticism?
A recurring theme in the youth studies literature is how best to character-
ise this apparent disconnect between young people and formal democratic 
politics in Britain. One position holds that their lack of presence in elec-
tions is indicative of political apathy or even of an emerging anti-politics 
sentiment. On the other side of this debate are those who consider this to 
represent young people’s deep-seated feelings of alienation from, and dis-
satisfaction with, mainstream electoral politics and (for some) of their turn 
toward alternative political interests and repertories (see, for instance: 
Stoker 2006; Hay 2007; Sloam 2007; Farthing 2010; Phelps 2012; 
Bastedo 2015; Busse et al. 2015; Henn and Oldfield 2016). In this book, 
we take the position that British youth feel frustrated with the practice of, 
and outcomes from, representative politics. For some, their abstention 
from the polls reflects this disillusionment. For others – particularly young 
left-cosmopolitans – there is an active search for the co-production of a new 
style of politics (electorally-orientated or otherwise) that is more  accessible, 
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flexible and bottom-up and which offers them a route to actualise their 
ambitions and aspirations.
Using data from two unique and linked studies that focus on the views 
and priorities of separate cohorts of British youth, we can see that this 
youth scepticism of professional politicians and mainstream national polit-
ical parties was an ongoing feature of the democratic landscape through-
out the first decade of the new Millennium. The first study was conducted 
in 2002 (Henn and Weinstein 2003) during an era of relative global pros-
perity, whilst the second study was completed in 2011 at the height of the 
current financial crisis (Henn and Foard 2012).1 Both were representative 
questionnaire surveys conducted across England, Scotland and Wales 
exactly a year after preceding General Elections in 2001 and 2010, and all 
participants were aged 18 at the time of each respective election. 
Consequently, survey respondents were newly-enfranchised adult citizens 
when taking part in our study, all with no prior experience of voting. They 
were therefore relatively politically inexperienced in comparison with their 
older contemporaries, and were consequently less likely to have formed 
deep-seated views about politics, parties and politicians. The 2002 sample 
included 705 young people, and the 2011 study involved 1,025 young 
respondents.
The results indicate that, contrary to expectations, both the 2002 and 
the 2011 youth samples expressed an interest both in politics in general 
(56% and 63% respectively) and in the previous General Election (48% and 
64%), although the 2011 cohort were clearly more engaged. However, 
half of the participants in each of the two samples lacked confidence in 
their own understanding of government and politics (55% in 2002 and 
50% in 2011), perhaps explaining the absence of many young people from 
the polls. Importantly, the young people in each of the studies felt politi-
cally powerless and considered that they had relatively little opportunity to 
intervene in the formal political process or to influence governmental 
decision- and policy-making (82% in 2002 and 61% in 2011). Although 
these findings represent a reduction in the sense of fatalism between the 
two elections, it offers a clear indication that British youth continued to 
feel alienated from the centres of political power.
It is therefore surprising that the data reveal that the larger group of 
young people in each of the two studies felt committed to elections (48% 
in 2002 and 56% in 2011), although a sizeable minority in each group 
were sceptical (35% and 37%). However, that broad support for the elec-
toral process did not translate directly into positive views of the intrinsic 
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value of elections. Indeed, only about a third of young people in both 
groups (28% in 2002 and 36% in 2011) agreed with the statement that by 
voting they ‘could really help to change the way that Britain is governed’. 
And, noticeable majorities agreed with the sceptical statement that ‘elec-
tions allow voters to express their opinions but don’t really change anything’ 
(60% and 57%).
Most revealing within the data was the perception held by young peo-
ple of the political elites elected to represent their interests in Parliament. 
Fig.  3.2 indicates that the young participants in the two studies disap-
proved of the political class for failing to champion their policy interests 
and aspirations. They considered parties and politicians to be cynical polit-
ical operators, ‘only interested in people’s votes, not in their opinions’ and 
who ‘soon lose touch with people’ once an election is over. Related to these 
findings are the overwhelming levels of scepticism expressed by the 2011 
cohort2 with respect to their lack of trust in the UK Government (only 
15% trust), political parties (8% trust) and politicians (7% trust).
Taken together, the findings from the survey signal that young people’s 
absence from elections and party-based politics is far from indicative of a 
generalised and inevitable political apathy – or that they are anti-democratic. 
7
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Political parties do a good
job of listening to young 
people’s concerns, and 
then responding to them
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Governments don’t really 
care what young people 
like me think.
Those elected to 
Parliament soon lose touch 
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Parties are only interested 
in people’s votes, not in 
their opinions
2002 2011
Fig. 3.2 Faith in political parties and professional politicians (%). (Source: Henn 
and Foard (2012). N = 705 (2002) and 1,025 (2011))
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Instead, these data suggest that British youth are interested in politics but 
they feel relatively powerless to intervene in the political process. 
Furthermore, they find the practice of, and outcomes from, formal elec-
torally-oriented politics deeply unsatisfactory, and feel that those political 
parties and professional politicians charged with conducting politics on 
their behalf are a remote, cynical and self-serving elite, paying little regard 
to the concerns and agendas of contemporary youth.
thE silEnt rEvolution in Youth Political 
EngagEmEnt
In the first part of this chapter, we considered a ‘supply-side’ approach 
that seeks to explain young people’s apparent disconnection from main-
stream politics in terms of their broad alienation from, and rejection of 
party-dominated electoral politics that they perceive as consistently failing 
to represent the priorities and aspirations of their generation. We now turn 
to an alternative explanation (Hay 2007) that views young people’s with-
drawal from mainstream politics as a consequence of the interplay of a 
series of ‘demand-side’ factors which are rooted in changing values and 
the emergence of a critical youth citizenry. In particular, the changing 
nature of contemporary British society is such that young people’s lives, 
perspectives and behaviour are increasingly complex, risky and uncertain 
(Giddens 1991). Reflecting these processes, they often adopt individual-
ised values and lifestyles which result in them privileging issue-based and 
identity politics over grand narratives. They are also inclined to embrace 
alternative forms of non-institutionalised and extra-parliamentary modes 
of political action discussed above. In the remaining sections of this chap-
ter, we consider such an explanation. This has its origins in Ronald 
Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis, and emphasizes a cultural values-based 
cleavage as an alternative to traditional economic/industrial-based 
cleavages.
Conventional explanations of political participation and engagement 
have tended to focus upon people’s socio-demographic characteristics, 
such as their social class, gender, ethnicity, and educational attainment 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Parry et  al. 1992). Additionally, the linked civic 
voluntarism model stresses the importance of resources that individuals 
have at their disposal, including the time, money, and the opportunities to 
participate in politics  – resources that may be structured by their 
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socio- demographic background (Verba et  al. 1995). In contemporary 
Britain, for instance, age when completed education (Whiteley 2012), 
educational qualifications (Tenn 2007), gender (Furlong and Cartmel 
2012), social class (Pattie et al. 2004) and ethnicity (Heath et al. 2011) 
are all considered to impact upon political outlook and behaviour.
Inglehart’s landmark study, ‘The Silent Revolution in Europe’ published 
in 1971, represented a critical departure from such socio-demographic 
explanations, and in particular, challenged the primacy of social class in the 
study of contemporary politics and society. He charted a transformation in 
the political value preferences that had occurred across West Europe 
between 1945 and the end of the 1960s (1971). He claimed that whereas 
their older contemporaries had been socialized through their experiences 
of post-War austerity into adopting priorities that emphasised their mate-
rial and physical security, the youth of the 1960s had been socialised under 
very different economic prosperity conditions. Freed from the urgency of 
material acquisition, following sharp rises in living standards, they were 
able to focus on higher-order postmaterial matters, such as the protection 
of the environment, social justice, political reforms, and freedom of expres-
sion (Inglehart 1997).
Whilst age was considered to be a critical factor underpinning the emer-
gence of materialist-postmaterialist cleavages, Inglehart also identified 
other key structuring variables. In particular, it was claimed that those 
from the new affluent middle class and those with extended formal educa-
tional experiences tended to have significantly higher levels of existential 
security than their working class and less highly educated contemporaries. 
As a consequence, these socio-demographic groups were considerably 
more likely to express postmaterialist value preferences (1971). Inglehart 
claimed that such developments represented the emergence of profound 
and long-term generational differences in value priorities that would cul-
minate in the eclipse of social class –based conflict by newer materialist and 
postmaterialist cultural cleavages (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). Recently, 
Inglehart and Norris have reiterated this claim:
Today, many of the most heated conflicts are cultural – based on issues such 
as immigration, the threat of terrorism, abortion rights, same-sex marriage, 
and more fluid gender identities and support for progressive change on 
these issues increasingly comes from well-educated younger generations of 
Post-materialists, largely of middle class origin. (Inglehart and Norris 2016: 
24)
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For Inglehart and his colleagues, the roots of this intergenerational 
cultural shift in political values lay deep in the changing economic condi-
tions in which pre-adult socialization occurred (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005). As these post-War western societies underwent a trans-
formation from economic austerity to relative prosperity, citizens social-
ized under such conditions would embrace postmaterialism over 
materialism, and this pattern would persist over time. Importantly, there 
was an appreciation that in times of economic austerity and crisis, the gen-
eral trend toward postmaterialism and cultural modernization might be 
arrested, as citizens’ subjective sense of economic security was undermined 
(Inglehart and Abramson 1994; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart 
2016). However, by the turn of the new millennium, he concluded that 
postmaterialism had grown in both stature and influence – even during 
periods of economic downturn, claiming that, ‘[t]he age-related differ-
ences examined … suggest that a process of intergenerational value change 
has been taking place during the past six decades and more’ (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005: 95; Inglehart 2008). More recently, analyses of data from 
the World Values Survey conducted by Abramson (2011), indicate an over-
all shift toward postmaterialism across Europe during the period 
1970–2006.
PostmatErialism anD contEmPorarY aDvancED 
inDustrial sociEtiEs
The value of Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis has been the subject of sig-
nificant debate. For instance, Flanagan et al. (2012) have presented recent 
evidence that intergenerational differences in patterns of political engage-
ment are cyclical, and that when they enter later stages of adulthood, 
young people will participate in politics in ways that mirror the behaviour 
and preferences of their older contemporaries. Elsewhere, Grasso (2014) 
has rejected the postmaterial notion that young people’s increasing with-
drawal from mainstream electoral politics and their interest in alternative 
and transformative styles of politics is rooted within underlying economic 
prosperity or austerity conditions. Instead, she sees this as a reflection of 
the period effects in which they have been socialised, such as the ideologi-
cal and volatile nature of contemporary societies.
Nonetheless, the thesis is widely considered to have offered a significant 
contribution to the field of social and political value change, and been 
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found to be in evidence in a range of different social, economic and tem-
poral contexts (Barnes et al. 1979; Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Taniguchi 
2006; Marthaler 2008; Janmaat and Braun 2009; Copeland 2014; Henn 
et al. 2017). Dalton (2009) has found similar patterns in his observations 
of a transition in the US from an ‘Old’ politics rooted in material scarcity 
concerns towards a ‘New’ politics characterised by expressive quality of life 
priorities. These new citizens are generally considered to be critically 
engaged with politics – albeit disillusioned with the performance of the 
political class (Norris 2011) and seeking social change. As Hay contends,
… the rise of post-material values has generated a better-educated, more 
savvy, less deferential and more critical electorate, less inclined to vote out of 
habit or out of simple respect for political authority, and less likely to be 
taken in by politics as a consequence. (Hay 2007: 154)
However, the current global economic crisis presents a considerable 
challenge to the growth of postmaterialist values in contemporary 
advanced industrial societies. Brym (2016: 195) claims that postmaterial-
ism is not a universally advancing phenomenon, and in recent years has 
become ‘a waning force among major world powers, giving way to increas-
ing nationalism and xenophobia’. Similarly, Janmaat (2016) has recently 
concluded that there are no particular links between postmaterialist values 
and current austerity conditions across a range of European and western 
states. And, Cameron’s (2013) analyses of data from the World Values 
Survey indicate a decline in postmaterialist values in several advanced 
democracies (though not in Britain) between 2005 and 2010.
Equally, patterns of materialist-postmaterialist value priorities within 
the youth population in Britain are not clear. Majima and Savage noted 
that throughout the 1990s, young people became progressively more 
materialist (2007). More recently, Theocharis (2011) claims that although 
there was a steady increase in young people’s postmaterialist value prefer-
ences in Britain between 1981 and 2005, there has occurred a fall in such 
priorities since 2009 corresponding with the onset of the international 
financial crisis. Elsewhere, Rheingans and Hollands (2013) have even 
identified a merging of ‘materialist’ and ‘postmaterialist’ political values in 
the 2010 UK student movement. However, Henn et  al. (2017) have 
recently concluded that the materialist-postmaterialist cleavage exerts a 
consistent and significant impact in terms of the shaping of young people’s 
political participation preferences in austerity Britain.
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In Chap. 2 of this book, we drew upon the work of Henn et al. (2017) 
and Inglehart and Norris (2016) to demonstrate that there has indeed 
been a turn towards postmaterialism and an embrace of cosmopolitan-left 
values and politics by many British youth that is founded on a progressive 
cultural change. In the final section of this particular chapter, we develop 
this idea and examine patterns of political engagement since the turn of 
the new Millennium by focusing on the views and priorities of separate 
cohorts of British youth – the first study conducted in 2002 during an era 
of relative global prosperity, and the second completed in 2011 at the 
height of the current financial crisis. In doing so, we consider the variety 
of youth groups as well as whether (and if so how) their political values are 
structured by key variables during these contrasting periods. Finally, we 
assess the currency of Inglehart’s thesis and whether or not postmaterial-
ism offers an alternative explanation for youth political (dis-)engagement, 
as well as whether this is contingent on the economic context of their pre- 
adult socialization.
Who arE thE Young British PostmatErialists?
In Chap. 2, we identified that postmaterialist values continue to play an 
important role in shaping the political participation preferences of many 
young people in Britain. But who are these young postmaterialists? 
Table  3.2 allows us to consider whether young people’s materialist- 
postmaterialist outlooks are structured by their social class, education, 
gender or ethnicity, and if the relative power of these variables is linked to 
whether they were socialized under conditions of economic prosperity or 
austerity. We compare materialists, postmaterialists as well as a ‘mixed’ 
group who express both materialist and postmaterialist values. The find-
ings indicate that ethnicity has little impact on the holding of materialist- 
postmaterialist value priorities. The 2002 sample reveals that there is a 
statistically significant gender gap under conditions of relative economic 
security, with young men considerably more materialist than young 
women (p = 0.044). However, the findings from the 2011 study suggest 
that young men and women socialized under conditions of economic scar-
city are equally as likely to prioritise materialist concerns, and to de- 
emphasise postmaterialist concerns (p = 0.254).
Inglehart’s claims that social class and education are positively related 
to materialist-postmaterialist value priories are broadly reflected in 
Table  3.2. Under the relatively affluent economic conditions of 2002, 
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those young people from middle class managerial or professional house-
holds were more likely to prioritise postmaterialist values than were their 
working class contemporaries (22.4–19.2%), and less likely to embrace 
materialist concerns (12.2–16.5%). As expected, the relative size of sup-
port for postmaterialist values decreased a decade later as the economy 
moved into deep recession. Interestingly, this decline in the levels of post-
materialism was less steep amongst the managerial/professional group 
than for working class youth, and there was a relative increase in the 
Postmaterialist-social class gap that is statistically significant (p = 0.020). 
This strengthening of the post/materialist-social class gap identified in the 
2011 youth sample suggests an enduring sustainability in postmaterialist 
value priorities among these British youth  – even for those socialized 
under conditions of relative economic austerity.
There is no evidence that level of educational attainment has a statisti-
cally significant impact for either the 2002 or the 2011 samples (p = 0.403 
and p = 0.130, respectively). However, remaining in full-time education 
beyond the age of 18 exerts an influence on young people’s materialist- 
postmaterialist outlooks. As anticipated, those with extended periods of 
formal full-time education were more likely to hold postmaterialist values 
than were those who had opted to leave at an earlier age. This pattern is 
evidenced in the 2002 sample, and even to a lesser extent in the 2011 
‘economic austerity’ cohort. Interestingly, when it comes to materialist 
values, the pattern is not consistent. Those remaining in formal education 
and emphasising materialist concerns outnumbered those who have left by 
a margin of 29.7–23.2%. This particular finding might be explained by the 
concerns of those young people embarking on a university career follow-
ing the 2010 announcement by the newly-elected Coalition Government 
to treble university tuition fees.
ExPlaining Youth Political EngagEmEnt: socio- 
DEmograPhic anD PostmatErialist valuE clEavagEs
So far, we have established that there is a degree of continuing commit-
ment by many young people to broadly postmaterialist concerns. We have 
also identified which groups within the youth population are most predis-
posed to a postmaterialist agenda – young postmaterialists are more likely 
than young materialists to be middle class and to have opted to stay in 
education beyond the age of 18. This is the case regardless of whether they 
were socialized under conditions of relative material prosperity or during 
 THE SILENT REVOLUTION IN YOUTH POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
60
times of economic austerity. In order to better understand contemporary 
and unfolding patterns of youth political engagement, it remains for us to 
consider the importance of the materialist-postmaterialist value cleavage 
compared to other socio-demographic cleavages associated with the civic 
voluntarism model, including gender, ethnicity social class and education- 
based differences.
Using hierarchical regression, Table  3.3 reveals that these socio- 
demographic variables display considerable predictive power for several 
aspects of political engagement, and for both of the time periods exam-
ined. In particular, there is evidence of statistically significant gaps with 
respect to gender, educational status and also social class location. 
However, the patterns between variables and across the time samples are 
not uniform.
As far as Political interest is concerned, young males, those who have 
opted to remain in full-time education, and those with a middle class back-
ground are considerably more interested than their counterparts. This is 
the case in both the 2002 and 2011 samples. Similar statistically significant 
gaps are present for gender, educational status and also social class factors 
at both time points for the Internal efficacy variable (which measures the 
degree of confidence that young people have in their own knowledge and 
understanding of politics). In addition, educational qualifications attained 
is also statistically significant for the 2011 cohort on this Internal efficacy 
variable. Those with higher level qualifications have more political self- 
confidence than other youth.
There are some important patterns of association in terms of the socio- 
demographic backgrounds of the two youth cohorts and the three depen-
dent variables that consider elections and voting. The Faith in the electoral 
process variable considers the extent to which young people feel that elec-
tions provide both an opportunity to have their voices heard by the 
 political class, and also for holding politicians to account for any election 
promises made. Under the relatively affluent conditions experienced by 
the 2002 cohort, gender and also social class are both statistically signifi-
cant predictors, with young males and those from middle class back-
grounds more positive than other young people. For the 2011 ‘austerity’ 
youth group, all of the five socio-demographic predictors bar social class 
have a significant bearing over this Faith in the electoral process variable.
The variable Value of elections, addresses perceptions that young people 
have of the effectiveness and veracity of elections as mechanisms for achiev-
ing meaningful societal change. Gender (2002 cohort) and also educa-
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tional status and social class position (2002 and 2011) demonstrate 
statistically significant effects on this election variable, with young women, 
those from middle class backgrounds and those remaining in full-time 
education considerably more supportive than their contemporaries.
The third elections and voting variable, Support for the principle of vot-
ing, considers the extent to which young people feel that voting is satisfy-
ing, effective, and a duty of citizenship. Again, social class and educational 
status are statistically significant predictors, whether young people were 
socialized under conditions of relative economic affluence (2002) or of 
austerity (2011). Level of qualifications held is also a statistically signifi-
cant predictor of this elections variable, but only in 2011.
Finally, there is evidence of socio-demographic background displaying 
some impact on youth perceptions of the political elite. Very few of the 
young people in our surveys expressed confidence in the political class. 
Nonetheless, there is a statistically-apparent social class gap on the ques-
tion of their levels of Trust in political parties and politicians, with those 
from professional middle-class households considerably less critical than 
working class youth – this is the case for both the ‘prosperity’ and the 
‘austerity’ samples. Elsewhere, the pattern is not uniform. Within the 
2002 cohort, time spent in education exerts a statistically significant bear-
ing on this trust variable, while there is also evidence of a significant eth-
nicity gap for the 2011 youth group. None of the other variables displayed 
a significant impact on young people’s level of trust in the political class (p > 
0.05).
Table 3.3 also reveals that the materialist-postmaterialist cleavage had a 
notable predictive impact on young people’s political engagement for the 
2002 youth sample. These young postmaterialists are considerably more 
interested in politics and elections than their materialist counterparts. 
Equally, their levels of internal efficacy, the value that they place on 
 elections and also their support for the principle of elections are each also 
statistically impacted by their materialist-postmaterialist preferences. As we 
would expect, results for the 2011 ‘austerity’ cohort indicate that the 
materialist-postmaterialist cleavage has less predictive power than for the 
earlier cohort, reflecting the importance of underlying economic condi-
tions in which pre-adult socialization occurred. Despite this, the materialist- 
postmaterialist cleavage did have a statistically-predictive impact on levels 
of political interest, with young postmaterialists significantly more inter-
ested than their materialist counterparts.
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summarY
There was a dramatic drop in electoral turnout at the 2001 UK General 
Election that persisted throughout the first decade of the new Millennium. 
Importantly, this pattern of voting was socially and generationally uneven. 
Those living in constituencies of relatively high socio-economic depriva-
tion, as well as traditionally marginalised groups such as the unemployed, 
social classes C2 and DE, ethnic minorities, and people living in privately 
rented sector were particularly absent from the polls. However, the pre-
dominant electoral cleavage was generational, with young people consid-
erably less likely than their older contemporaries to vote at the General 
Elections in 2001, 2005 and 2010.
This ongoing abstention from the polls fuelled a discourse within the 
media, academia and the corridors of Westminster that a politically unin-
terested and disengaged generation were withdrawing from the demo-
cratic process – and that they might carry their disenchantment with them 
into later life and in time replace older, more electorally-participative gen-
erations. Such concerns were succinctly summarised in a report from the 
House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in 
2014 which, drawing particular attention to young people, concluded 
that, ‘[D]emocracy is working less well than it used to and we need to 
move swiftly to pre-empt a crisis. The scale of the response must be equal 
to the task’ (2014: 6). The advent of the global economic crisis at the end 
of the decade and the 2010 Coalition Government’s programme of aus-
terity hit young people particularly hard, and served to exacerbate their 
withdrawal from the electoral arena. High-profile policy U-turns such as 
the tripling of university tuition fees intensified young people’s collective 
sense that the political class could not be trusted to champion their inter-
ests in Parliament.
But young people are not a homogenous group with a fixed and uni-
form view of democracy or of those who are elected to positions of politi-
cal power. In this chapter we have observed that young people’s political 
values and behaviours vary dramatically in terms of factors such as gender, 
ethnicity, social class and educational career. In particular, we have noticed 
that there is a specific group of young people – who are typically female, 
middle class and highly educated – who retain a strong commitment to 
postmaterialist priorities such as internationalism, environmentalism and 
social justice, and who are especially well-informed about, and critical of, 
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British politics. These results are supported by our analyses of the 2016 
EU referendum and the 2017 General Election in Chaps. 4 and 5.
As we would expect from Inglehart’s thesis, the relative weight of sup-
port for postmaterialist preferences declined over the course of the first 
decade of the new Millennium, reflecting the transition from a youth 
socialization context of relative economic prosperity to one of economic 
insecurity following the onset of the global financial crisis. Nonetheless, 
even under austerity conditions, many young people continue to display a 
strong attachment to postmaterialist concerns and broadly cosmopolitan- 
left values and politics.
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2. These trust questions were only asked in the 2011 study.
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CHAPTER 4
Young Cosmopolitans Against Brexit
The June 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the European 
Union provided a major shock to the political establishment. The decision 
to leave the EU, by a margin of 52–48%, represented a rejection of what 
the vast majority of political and business elites considered to be in the 
country’s best economic interests, in preference to returning sovereignty 
over political decision-making to the United Kingdom and reducing net 
migration. The Leave campaign was characterized by populist appeals to 
national identity and the (perceived) cultural threat posed by European 
integration. It also sought to capitalize on strong anti-establishment senti-
ment towards the British political elite.
These events must be viewed within the broader context of the rise 
of authoritarian-nationalist forms of populism: from the success of far-
right parties in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Freedom 
Party in Austria, the Law and Justice party in Poland, and Fidesz in 
Hungary, to the election of Donald Trump in the United States. Some 
commentators in America branded Trump’s victory a ‘cultural back-
lash’ against the liberal social values of the Obama administration 
(Gusterson 2017; Norris and Inglehart 2018). The decision, in the 
UK, to leave the European Union, can be seen as a product of these 
same forces. It was no surprise, therefore, that Marine Le Pen in France 
applauded the referendum result, or that US Presidential candidate 
Trump was keen to associate himself with Nigel Farage. In a trium-
phant address to a Trump rally in Jackson, Mississippi on 24 August 
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2016, Farage encouraged American voters to take the opportunity to 
‘beat the pollsters… the commentators… and Washington’.
These authoritarian-nationalist movements and parties, including the 
campaign for Britain to leave the European Union and the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), were characterised by an economic- 
cultural paradox. On the one hand, a large amount of support for Brexit 
and UKIP was drawn from economically disadvantaged communities and 
social groups (Ford and Goodwin 2014). And, those who were well-off or 
had high levels of educational attainment were very likely to support 
British membership of the EU. On the other hand, the fault lines between 
Remainers and Leavers were clearest on cultural issues such as immigration 
and national sovereignty, and attitudes towards ethnic and cultural 
diversity.
The EU referendum result was, therefore, defined by socio-economic 
cleavages and cultural conflict. But the decision to leave the European 
Union was more nuanced than this would suggest. For a start, referenda 
are always partly a plebiscite on the popularity of the incumbent govern-
ment. Second, internal cultural dynamics within the UK were also at play: 
including, the assertion of ‘Englishness’ (and its conflation with 
Euroscepticism through UKIP); the rise of the Scottish National Party 
(and its support for European integration); and, the relative acceptance of 
immigration and diversity across London. There were also clear asymme-
tries on how important ‘Europe’ was viewed as an issue – it was ranked 
very highly and relatively lowly by Leavers and Remainers, respectively.
Age was another key variable in determining whether an individual 
voted for Remain or Leave. As we show in this chapter, the differences 
between the views of younger and older citizens over the question of 
European integration were stark. With regard to age, our survey showed 
that the vast majority of young people – 69% of 18–30 year olds and 76% 
of 18–21 year olds – voted for the UK to remain in the EU. But why did 
they do so? Which groups of young people were most likely to support 
EU membership? And, to what extent does the young Remain vote cor-
respond with the cosmopolitan-left group of Young Millennials identified 
in this book?
This chapter begins by discussing the linkages between authoritarian- 
nationalist forms of populism (and socialist-internationalist ideology) and 
Euroscepticism, and outlines pre-existing attitudes towards the European 
Union in the UK in comparison to other established European democra-
cies. Afterwards, it examines youth engagement in the referendum 
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 campaign, before underlining the influence of age and socio-economic 
status on the referendum result. Drawing upon data from a representative 
survey of 1,351 young adults (18–30 year olds),1 the chapter provides a 
detailed examination of the demographic profile of young Remain voters 
and the issues and values that drove them to vote Remain.
Our findings reveal that young Remainers were characterized by 
cosmopolitan- left values and attitudes, as illustrated by their concerns for 
the economic consequences of a potential Brexit and by their strong sup-
port for cultural diversity. Despite their overwhelming backing for the 
establishment position in the referendum, these young people harboured 
high levels of antipathy towards the Conservative Government (and Prime 
Minister, David Cameron), as well as low levels of trust in politicians in 
general.
We claim that the EU referendum, whilst acting as a lightning rod for 
resurgent nationalism amongst many older and less well-off citizens, also 
led to the crystallization of a common sense of political identity amongst 
Young Millennials in reaction to the negative impact of austerity upon 
their lives and what was perceived as an economically costly and inward- 
looking Brexit vote. The increase in political activism amongst these 
younger voters provided a springboard for the surge in support for the 
Labour Party in the 2017 UK General Election (explored in Chap. 5).
PoPulism, CosmoPolitanism and the Question 
of euroPe
Public attitudes towards the European Union have been strongly influ-
enced by citizens’ cultural values (their social liberalism or social conserva-
tism), by their views on the role of markets and the state, and also by 
national perspectives on European integration.
In Chap. 2, we considered the rise of nationalism and populist politics 
in the United States and Europe. In Europe, this resurgence has the added 
dimension of fuelling scepticism towards the EU (Mudde 2016). The 
existing literature establishes a clear link between Euroscepticism and the 
populist right, manifesting itself around the issues of immigration and 
national sovereignty (Hobolt 2016). Several studies have also shown that 
previous national referendums on various questions of European integra-
tion have provided fertile ground for populist parties and social move-
ments (de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005).
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Although cosmopolitan values and left-of-centre politics are sometimes 
associated with pro-European views, it would be wrong to assume that 
this is always the case. From a radical cosmopolitan perspective, the 
European Union has been accused of becoming Fortress Europe  – for 
example, advocating freedom of movement internally, while at the same 
time closing the door to immigrants from the developing world (Rumford 
2005). And, many on the left of the political spectrum have criticized the 
EU’s support for free markets, deregulation and fiscal conservatism at the 
expense of social policies and state-run public services (Scharpf 2002). 
This was laid bare during the recent sovereign debt crisis when the imposi-
tion of austerity (through the European Stability Mechanism) was vehe-
mently opposed by left-wing parties in debtor countries, including Syriza 
in Greece and PoDemos in Spain. These reservations also account for the 
lukewarm attitude of Jeremy Corbyn to European integration. During the 
referendum campaign, the Labour leader expressed himself as only seven 
out of ten in favour of an EU that, in his view, was not doing enough on 
human rights and social cohesion (BBC Online, 11 June 2016). Even so, 
there are important, qualitative differences between authoritarian- 
nationalist and cosmopolitan-left forms of Euroscepticism. The former is 
fixed upon returning sovereignty to ‘nation states’. The latter aims to 
establish tighter social and economic controls at the EU level, and allow 
greater scope for state involvement in the economy and growth-oriented 
fiscal policy.
Hobolt (2016: 1260) explains that the Brexit vote also reflected ‘a lack 
of economic opportunities and anger with the political class’. However, 
anti-establishment sentiment has been a prominent feature of both 
authoritarian- nationalist and cosmopolitan-left politics. In the wake of the 
financial crisis, a wave of protest gathered against corporate greed, neo- 
liberal policies, and a lack of social investment. This manifested itself in 
support for Occupy, the Spanish Indignados and in the emergence of new 
electoral challengers, such as Corbyn, Sanders and PoDemos, and also 
illustrated the preference of young cosmopolitan-left citizens for political 
outsiders. Anti-establishment sentiment certainly helped to drive the 
Leave vote amongst the general adult population. However, we present 
evidence to show that young Remainers were actually less trusting of 
mainstream politicians than young Leavers and the average young 
person.
The UK has experienced a troubled relationship with the European 
Community (EC), now the EU, from the very beginning of the integration 
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project: from its initial reluctance to join, to Margaret Thatcher’s intransi-
gence on Britain’s budgetary contribution, to the political crisis over the 
Maastricht Treaty (forming the EU), to David Cameron’s decision to pull 
the British Conservatives out of the centre-right European People’s Party. 
Even pro-European Prime Minister Tony Blair, found it hard to gain sup-
port for European integration against the backdrop of a divided political 
establishment, a hostile media, and a sceptical public. According to 
Eurobarometer (European Commission 2017) data, the proportion of 
British citizens who thought that membership of the European Union was 
a good thing versus a bad thing was only +17 percentage points in 2006, 
compared to an average score of +49 across nine other established European 
democracies.2
This relative indifference or antipathy towards the EU was exacerbated 
both directly by a rapid increase in immigration from new member states 
after Eastern enlargement in 2004 and the reputational damage caused by 
the Eurozone crisis (Curtice 2017), and indirectly by the anger and frus-
tration of European citizens with all layers of politics in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. By 2011, the proportion of British citizens believing 
that EU membership was a good thing versus a bad thing had plummeted 
to a score of −6, compared to an average of +33 in nine other old member 
states (European Commission 2017).3
Nevertheless, younger citizens have tended to be more trusting of the 
EU: in 2014, 42% of 15–24 year olds across all member states trusted the 
EU compared to 31% of all citizens and 28% of over 65s (European 
Commission 2014). In the UK, the age differential has become particu-
larly large. Despite rising levels of Euroscepticism within the general pop-
ulation, the mainstream media and political elites, young people have 
remained very supportive of British membership. Thus, youth (18–24 year 
olds’) support for the UKIP at its highpoint in the 2015 General Election 
reached only 8%, compared to 13% of all adults and 17% of over 65s (Ipsos 
MORI 2015).
Youth engagement in the eu referendum
Young Britons’ support for membership was not matched  – initially at 
least – by high levels of interest in the referendum. As we shall see later in 
the chapter, Europe and the EU were not high-priority issues for young 
people compared to older citizens. Our YouGov survey revealed that only 
39% of 18–24 year olds (and 31% of 18–30 year olds) found the campaign 
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interesting six weeks prior to the vote. Unsurprisingly, this figure was 
higher for those young people who identified themselves as intending to 
vote for Remain or Leave. The initial lack of interest in the referendum 
was mirrored by younger citizens’ intention to vote or abstain: only 50% 
of 18–24 year olds and 56% of 26–30 year olds declared that they were 
certain to vote on 23 June 2016.
However, we should be cautious about this interpretation of the data. 
It may be that the low prioritization of Europe as an issue reflected satis-
faction with the status quo; that for most young people, the EU was not a 
controversial issue. As we shall see, there is evidence to show that, as the 
race tightened and the debate heated up, the referendum ‘stimulated the 
political interest of Britain’s young people’ (Fox and Pearce 2016). And, 
after the vote, young people became deeply concerned about the prospect 
of Brexit (Sloam 2018).
Another explanation for the low prioritization of Europe as an issue by 
(young) Remain supporters is their lack of knowledge about the EU and 
how it works. UK citizens are known to have low levels of knowledge 
about the EU when compared to their counterparts elsewhere in Europe, 
and this lack of political knowledge is particularly pronounced amongst 
younger cohorts (Hix 2015).
The Conservative Government believed that it would win the referen-
dum comfortably by focussing on the economic risks of leaving the EU 
and securing the backing of political and economic elites – from the main 
party leaders, to Alan Sugar, to Mark Carney, to Barack Obama. On the 
other hand, both the official Vote Leave campaign and the more extreme 
UKIP-led operation emphasized the ‘threat’ of immigration, which was 
linked to the need to ‘take back control’ from Brussels and halt payments 
to the EU budget. Curtice (2017) demonstrates that both the Remain 
argument on the economy and the Leave argument on immigration were 
broadly accepted by public opinion. The crux of the matter was, therefore, 
which of these issues were perceived as being more important. As we dem-
onstrate further on in the chapter, young people perceived the economy as 
far more important than immigration (in sharp contrast to citizens over 65 
years of age).
The Vote Remain and Vote Leave campaigns were characterized by 
posters and slogans that highlighted these winning issues. Vote Remain 
posters read: ‘For Every £1 We Put Into the EU We Get Almost £10 back’ 
(through trade, investment, jobs, growth and low prices); ‘Britain Out of 
Europe, Your Family Out of Pocket’; and, ‘3 Million UK Jobs are Linked 
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to Our Trade With the EU’. These messages appealed to young people’s 
concerns about the negative economic consequences of Brexit, but little 
else. Less well advertised issues included the assertion that ‘EU Laws 
Protect Women’s Rights’.
The Vote Leave campaign opted for: ‘Turkey (population 76 million) is 
Joining the EU’, and ‘Let’s Give the NHS the £350 Million the EU Takes 
Every Week’. These claims were flanked by UKIP’s infamous ‘Breaking 
Point’ poster with an image of a queue of immigrants at a border crossing 
and another which implied that schools were being ‘over-run’ by immi-
grants. These messages were most likely to appeal to older, less well-off, 
and less highly-educated social groups.
The simple, emotional appeals adopted by the Leave campaigns aroused 
greater passion than the economic and pragmatic arguments of the Remain 
camp. Vote Leave was, thus, able to dominate coverage in the (sympa-
thetic) mainstream media. But the Leave campaign’s dominance of social 
media was surprising. Even though most social media have a young, 
socially liberal demographic (that was very likely to vote Remain), ‘the 
campaign to leave had routinely outmuscled its rival, with more vocal and 
active supporters across almost all social media platforms’ (Polonski 2016).
Although our cosmopolitan-left group of young people distrusted and 
opposed the economic policies of the Cameron Government that fronted 
the Remain campaign, it is easy to see how the Leave campaign’s use of 
nationalist and xenophobic tropes provoked the counter-mobilization of 
this group of socially liberal young people during and beyond the 
referendum.
the role of age and soCial status in the eu 
referendum
Figure 4.1 shows the results of YouGov and Lord Ashcroft polls con-
ducted on the day after the referendum (excluding those who said that 
they did not turn out to vote).4 It shows that young people (18–30 year 
olds) were by far the most likely of any age group to support British mem-
bership of the EU. Nearly 7 in 10 (69%) of this cohort claimed to have 
voted Remain, compared to 51% of all adults,5 and 36% of over 65s. Social 
class was also very important in determining voter choice: 59% of citizens 
with a higher than average social grade (ABC1) wanted to remain in the 
EU in contrast to 39% of those with a lower than average social grade 
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(C2DE voters). The results were even more striking with regard to levels 
of educational attainment. A very large majority (71%) of those with a 
university degree wanted Britain to stay in the Union, compared to just 
34% of those with GCSEs or lower. A large majority of ethnic minority 
citizens (68%) voted in favour of Remain. And, there was also a regional 
dimension to the vote: Londoners (62%) and Scots (59%) both opted 
decisively for Remain (as did many large cities, including Manchester, 
Liverpool and Bristol). For adults of all ages, gender did not seem to be a 
major factor in influencing voter choice – although women were slightly 
more likely to report having voted to remain in the EU (by 52–48%), 
while men were marginally more likely to vote to leave (by 51–49%).
A great deal of research has been carried out on voting patterns in the EU 
referendum. These studies depict those who voted Leave as the ‘losers of 
globalization’ or the ‘left behind’, who are most likely to be over 50, male, 
working class, and have low levels of educational attainment (Goodwin and 
Heath 2016; Hobolt 2016; Jennings and Stoker 2016; Clarke et al. 2017). 
This can be contrasted with Remain voters, who have been characterized as 
‘winners of globalization’, who are most likely to be young, female and 
highly educated. We emphasize the fact that there was also a strong cultural 
component to the referendum vote based on issues of regional identity and 
attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigration.
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Fig. 4.1 Support for ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ in EU referendum by social group 
(excluding ‘don’t knows’ and ‘won’t votes’) (%). (Sources: YouGov 2016, Lord 
Ashcroft Polls 2016. YouGov N = 1351; Lord Ashcroft N = 12,369)
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The existing literature has much to say about the importance of inter-
generational differences in voting patterns but has little to say on intragen-
erational voter choice. This is important for young people, because youth 
political participation does not always reflect patterns of participation in 
the country as a whole. For instance, we show that young women were 
much more likely to vote Remain than young men, even though gender 
did not seem to influence voter choice amongst adults of all ages. The fol-
lowing section identifies more precisely the characteristics of those young 
Remainers, who were so diametrically opposed to the cultural politics of 
older generations.
Young remainers as Young CosmoPolitans
In this section, we explore the role that demographic factors, identities, 
values, policy preferences and trust in politicians played in shaping the 
youth vote in the EU referendum focussing on those groups of Young 
Millennials that were more likely to vote Remain than the average young 
person.
Figure 4.2 displays the results for groups of young people voting 
Remain across a range of social and demographic measures. Supporting 
the conclusions of the post-referendum studies, we found that education 
was very strongly associated with voting Remain, with 82% of full-time 
students claiming that they did so.6 Our own qualitative research suggests 
that this might be explained by the fact that full-time students were more 
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Fig. 4.2 Support for ‘remain’ amongst sub-groups of 18–30 year olds (exclud-
ing ‘dont knows’ & ‘won’t votes’) (%). (Source: YouGov 2016. N = 1,351)
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exposed to the campaign in colleges and on campuses (Sloam 2018). 
Being of a higher social grade (ABC1) was also associated with voting 
Remain  – 76% of this group voted remain  – but less so than being in 
education.
The findings regarding education and social grade lend support to the 
winners and losers of globalisation thesis. Younger people who were better 
off and possessed higher levels of educational attainment, were more sup-
portive of EU membership – developing an image of the well-educated, 
economically successful Remain voter. Younger citizens who had lower 
levels of educational attainment, or who fell into the C2DE social cate-
gory, were much more evenly split between Remain and Leave.
The socio-demographic results also revealed clear differences on the 
basis of age, gender and ethnicity. It was immediately apparent that, within 
our sample of young people, the very youngest group – 18–21 year olds – 
were more likely to support British membership of the EU than 22–30 
year olds by 77–66%. To a large extent, this reflects the fact that 18–21 
year olds are much more likely than 22–30 year olds to be in full-time 
education.
Young women were also more likely to vote Remain than their male 
counterparts by 75–63%. This latter finding correlates with the rate of 
young, female support for Corbyn’s Labour Party in the 2017 General 
Election (see Chap. 5), demonstrating the ongoing existence of a female 
cosmopolitan-left political grouping. Ethnicity also played a role in deter-
mining voter choice. In spite of the fact that they were, as a group, less 
well-off and less highly-educated than their white counterparts, 75% of 
young ethnic minorities voted Remain. One explanation for this high 
score is that the negative portrayal of immigrants in the Leave campaign 
persuaded young ethnic minority citizens to vote Remain. Although the 
results for young women and minority groups do not confound the left 
behind thesis, they suggest that other, political and cultural factors were 
also at work.
With respect to identity and values, those who saw themselves primarily 
as British or Scottish were more likely to vote Remain than the average 
young person – by 74% and 75% to 69%, respectively (Fig. 4.3, below). 
Both primary English and Welsh identity were associated with a lower like-
lihood of voting Remain. The case of Scottish identity defies resource- 
based explanations of the EU referendum. In purely geographical terms, 
our poll recorded that 83% of young people living in Scotland favoured EU 
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membership (compared to just 64% of 18–30 year olds from Wales and the 
Midlands). Other research has shown that a cosmopolitan, outward- 
looking sense of identity is also related to the urban-rural divide (Jennings 
and Stoker 2016). Even taking into account socio-economic status, city 
dwellers tend to have more positive views regarding cultural diversity and 
the European Union.
When it came to party identification, an overwhelming 81% of young 
Labour Party identifiers claimed that they would vote Remain (compared 
to the almost unanimous 94% of young Liberal Democrat identifiers). 
This provides further evidence of the linkages between voting Remain in 
2016 and Labour in 2017. Young Conservative Party identifiers were mar-
ginally in favour of British membership of the European Union (55%), but 
significantly less likely to vote Remain than the average young person. So, 
support for an opposition party (Labour, Liberal Democrat, Green or 
SNP – though not, of course, UKIP) actually made it more likely that a 
young person would side with the official Government position in the 
referendum. In essence, young people voted for continued membership of 
the EU despite their opposition to the Government of the day.
On the subject of cultural diversity, those who responded positively to 
the question ‘Do you think that having a wide variety of backgrounds and 
cultures is a positive or negative part of modern Britain?’ were overwhelm-
ingly supportive of membership of the EU. In fact, this issue was more 
strongly associated with voting Remain than any other demographic, value 
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Fig. 4.3 Support for ‘remain’ amongst 18–30 year olds by values, identity, party 
allegiance and trust (excluding ‘dont knows’ & ‘won’t votes’) (%). (Source: 
YouGov 2016. N = 1,351)
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or identity variable that we tested (with the exception of the small number 
of Liberal Democrat identifiers and the tiny proportion of those who saw 
themselves primarily as ‘European’). A huge majority (89%) of young 
Remainers answered positively to this question. This paints a picture of 
young Remain voters as postmaterialist, cosmopolitan liberals, who were 
at ease with cultural heterogeneity.
Figure 4.4 compares various policy issues that were considered impor-
tant by young Remain voters, young Leave voters and young people in 
general. Young Remainers believed that the most important issues facing 
the country were (in order) healthcare, the economy, housing, education, 
Europe, the environment, immigration and asylum, and defence and ter-
rorism. Whilst material, economic issues were placed firmly at the top of 
young Remainers’ policy agendas, they were closely followed by interna-
tional and postmaterialist policy items associated with the cosmopolitan- 
left. Young Remainers were predominantly in favour of increased public 
spending on the NHS and education, greater state intervention in the 
housing market, retaining membership of the European Union, and more 
action to protect the environment. Immigration and security issues, 
 associated with authoritarian-nationalist sentiment, were considered to be 
least important by young Remainers. The largest gaps between Remain 
and Leave were to be found on immigration and asylum (−44 percentage 
points), education (+22), health (+21), and the environment (+18).
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Fig. 4.4 Most important issues facing the country for all 18–30 year olds and by 
support for ‘remain’ and ‘leave’ (%). (Source: YouGov 2016. N = 1,351)
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We found, earlier in the chapter, that young Leavers were more inter-
ested in the EU referendum than young Remainers. Figure 4.4 reveals 
that young Leavers also placed the question of Europe higher up on their 
list of political priorities for the UK. More than a third (37%) of those 
young people who supported Brexit believed it was one of the most 
important issues facing the country (second only to immigration), com-
pared with 27% of those who supported British membership of the EU 
and 24% of all 18–30 year olds. Again, we would argue that this illustrates 
the relative contentment of young Remainers with the status quo.
Although voting Remain was the establishment choice (advocated 
by all the major parties with the exception of UKIP), we found that it 
was actually young Remain voters who were least likely to trust politi-
cians. Figure 4.5 shows that young Remainers had a net trust score of 
−28 percentage points (those who trusted politicians a fair amount or 
a great deal minus those who had no trust at all in politicians), margin-
ally below that of the average young person (−26) and young Leavers 
(−23). This lack of political trust, nevertheless, came hand-in-hand 
with greater social trust (something one would expect of a more pros-
perous, highly-educated group). A large majority (61%) of young 
Remain supporters trusted their fellow young people compared to 47% 
of those that favoured Leave. This last result suggests that young 
Leavers may have bought into the narrative of a ‘broken Britain’ – a 
country that was being undermined by “others” through immigration 
and multiculturalism.
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Fig. 4.5 Net trust of young people, young remainers and young leavers in politi-
cians (‘fair amount’ and ‘great deal’ minus ‘not at all’). (Source: YouGov 2016. N 
= 1,351)
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Young PeoPle PolitiCallY energised bY brexit
In the opening chapters, we explained how young people have increas-
ingly been drawn to issue-based forms of political engagement – to causes 
that have a tangible meaning for their everyday lives. In this regard, the 
European Union initially appeared to many young people as a rather 
remote and abstract issue, which was much less important than pressing 
economic concerns regarding jobs, housing and healthcare.
We have already demonstrated that youth political interest in the referen-
dum was very low despite the large amount of media coverage devoted to 
the EU before and after the 2015 General Election, through David 
Cameron’s efforts to re-negotiate Britain’s relationship with the European 
Union, to the start of the campaign proper. We have also alluded to the lack 
of self-proclaimed political knowledge amongst UK citizens, which was par-
ticularly the case for young people. In our survey, only 50% of 18–30 year 
olds claimed to know ‘a great deal’ or ‘a fair amount’ about the European 
Union and what it does. It is worth noting that levels of interest and knowl-
edge were much lower amongst young women (who are more likely to be 
young cosmopolitan-left Remainers) than amongst young men. Only 39% 
of young women claimed to be knowledgeable about the EU.
These findings are supported by our qualitative analysis of ‘#Votebecause’, 
an initiative to engage higher education students in the referendum, that 
took place across several university campuses during the campaign period 
(Sloam 2018). Through our student interviews and ethnographic observa-
tions of student behaviour, it became abundantly clear that Europe was not 
seen as a controversial subject. Since nine out of ten student interviewees in 
our sample were in favour of the status quo, it was hard to generate the 
sense of urgency witnessed on the Leave side.
However, we also witnessed that students became increasingly engaged 
as a result of the initiative and through their exposure to the campaign 
around campus (for example, through debates and lectures about the EU 
and the referendum), on TV, via online news feeds, and through their own 
social networks. Our analysis identified the key role of discussion and 
deliberation during the campaign. One student volunteer summed up 
how this worked with regard to #Votebecause: it encouraged ‘people to 
tell you what they think… they just really open up about it. And, after 
doing the questionnaire, they were more engaged in what the campaign 
was about, and why we were asking the questions.’ (Key Informant, male, 
aged 18).
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In the end, youth voter turnout in the referendum was reported to be 
far higher than in the general election one year earlier. According to Ipsos 
MORI (2016) and British Social Attitudes (Curtice and Simpson 2018) 
data, the turnout of 18–24 year olds was 53% and 66%, respectively – an 
estimated 14 and 10 percentage points higher than at the 2015 General 
Election. We designed a survey before the 2017 General Election, which 
asked young people and adults of all ages how closely they were following 
the election and their views on Brexit.7 A huge majority (81%) of 18–24 
year olds in our sample claimed that they were following the general elec-
tion closely, compared to an average of 80% for all age groups (and only 
topped by the interest of the over-65 age group). Moreover, 88% of 18–24 
year olds stated that they were following Brexit negotiations closely  – 
more than any other age group. So, young people were energised both by 
the EU referendum and in reaction to the referendum result.
summarY
The European Union referendum provided a unique test of British public 
opinion. On the one hand, young people were overwhelmingly in favour 
of the UK remaining in the EU – around three quarters of 18–24 year olds 
(and 70% of 18–30 year olds) voted Remain. On the other hand, the 
Remain campaign was championed by a Government and political estab-
lishment that was deeply unpopular amongst younger citizens. In this con-
text, this chapter has attempted to draw the contours of a cosmopolitan-left 
group of citizens in the UK, characterized by young Remainers, which 
reflects a broader trend in youth political engagement across many estab-
lished democracies.
From the findings, we are able to develop a profile of the typical young 
person who voted Remain in June 2016. The conventional socio- 
demographic characteristics most strongly associated with voting Remain 
were being highly-educated (and being a full-time student) and being of a 
higher (ABC1) social grade. In this regard, the chapter lends support to 
the winners and losers of globalisation thesis. Young people who were of a 
higher socio-economic status, were more likely to support continued EU 
membership. Having a lower level of educational attainment or being of a 
lower social grade (C2DE) was (as expected) associated with voting Leave. 
However, the above average support of young women, young ethnic 
minorities, young Scots and young city dwellers for Remain demonstrates 
that the left behind thesis can only explain part of the picture.
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Young, well-educated, politically engaged individuals could be consid-
ered to be both winners and losers of globalisation. Whilst emphasizing 
the growing gap between the super-rich and everyone else, these young 
cosmopolitans tend to hold postmaterialist concerns over issues such as 
the environment and embrace the cultural diversity which defines their 
societies. These young people are the very antithesis of the contemporary 
wave of authoritarian-nationalist populism that has captured so much 
media attention. Conversely, the small proportion of young people who 
prioritised the issue of immigration, asylum, national defence and terror-
ism were much more likely to belong to the 30% of 18–30 year olds who 
voted for Brexit.
Contrary to expectations, young Remain voters were less likely to trust 
politicians than young Leavers. This defies much of the political commen-
tary, which identified anti-establishment sentiment and a lack of trust in 
conventional politics as major drivers of the Brexit vote. Despite their rela-
tive lack of trust in the political class that led the campaign for continued 
EU membership, these voters opted for Remain. In fact, the demographic 
and attitudinal profile of Britain’s young Remainers resembles that of 
social movement participants, such as those who supported Occupy Wall 
Street and the Spanish Indignados, whose momentum was converted into 
strong electoral performances for PoDemos in Spain and Bernie Sanders 
in US. In the UK, young cosmopolitan-left citizens were galvanized by 
the referendum into a coherent political force that – as we explain in Chap. 
5 – was harnessed by the Labour Party, under Jeremy Corbyn, at the 2017 
General Election.
notes
1. The survey was designed by the authors, commissioned by Hope Not Hate 
and Bite the Ballot from YouGov, and fielded between 6 and 13 May 2016. 
It provided a representative sample of 18–30 year olds with regard to age, 
gender, geographical location (excluding Northern Ireland), ethnicity and 
occupational status.
2. The large, established democracies referred to here are Belgium, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
3. It should be noted that public perceptions of the EU as ‘a good thing’ have 
diverged dramatically since the financial crisis, between those countries that 
were worst affected (the average score in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy 
fell to +20 in 2011) and the rest (the average score remained stable at +42 in 
the other five countries).
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4. In Fig.  4.1., YouGov statistics were used for all groups except BAME 
citizens.
5. This survey estimate compares with the actual result, where 48% of UK vot-
ers supported Remain.
6. In this chapter we focus on ‘being in education’ rather than ‘educational 
attainment’ amongst 18–30 year olds, given the fact that those with high 
levels of educational attainment (university degrees) are an older sub-set 
within this sample (and differences in this age within this cohort are rela-
tively large).
7. We designed a Populus poll (commissioned by Freud and Bite the Ballot) 
that was fielded from 10 May to 11 May 2017. The sample was comprised 
of 2,007 UK citizens, including 218 18–24 year olds.
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CHAPTER 5
Youthquake: Young People and the 2017 
General Election
In Chap. 3, we highlighted the persistence of postmaterialist values in a 
hostile economic environment, which has led to the emergence of a 
cosmopolitan- left group of young people as a political force in the UK. In 
Chap. 4, we explained how this manifested itself in youth engagement in 
the referendum – in favour of British membership of the European Union. 
Here, we argue that the impact of the financial crisis and austerity politics, 
the continued existence of postmaterialist values and an increase in cul-
tural conflict, the galvanizing effect of the EU referendum, and the anti- 
establishment credentials of the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, 
combined to set off a youthquake in political participation at the 2017 
General Election.
When Theresa May called a general election on 18 April 2017, the 
result was seen by many as a foregone conclusion. The polls predicted an 
emphatic victory for the Conservative Party, which would strengthen the 
Prime Minister’s hand in the wake of the 2016 EU referendum vote for 
Brexit. In February 2017, an Ipsos MORI (2017a) poll recorded a 37–31% 
advantage for the Conservatives over Labour, and May enjoyed a +17 net 
satisfaction rating compared to −38 for Jeremy Corbyn. Interestingly, 
given the surge in youth support for the Labour Party, there was no sig-
nificant difference in young adults’ (18–24 year olds) satisfaction with the 
two leaders at this point in time: +2 for May, and +3 for Corbyn. This 
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highlights the dramatic upturn in fortunes for Corbyn and the Labour 
Party during the campaign period.
The election result was a surprise. The Conservative Party improved its 
share of the vote to 42% (up 5.5 points from 2015), but the Labour Party 
increased its share of the vote to 40% (up 9.6 points from 2015). This led 
to a loss for the Conservatives of 13 seats in Parliament, forcing it into a 
fragile coalition with the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland. 
We argue that principal driving forces behind the result included the 
increase in youth engagement and activism during the campaign and the 
vote, as well as the switch in youth support to the Labour Party and Jeremy 
Corbyn as standard-bearers for cosmopolitan-left sentiment.
With regard to political interest, it is important to reiterate the fact that 
young people were relatively engaged in politics prior to the 2017 General 
Election (compared to the general election two years earlier). Although 
turnout estimates vary, it is generally accepted that a considerably larger 
proportion of 18–24 year olds had voted in the 2016 EU referendum than 
in the 2015 General Election (Bruter 2016). At the end of the previous 
chapter, we also reported the results of our 2017 Populus Poll that 81% of 
18–24 year olds claimed to be following the election campaign closely (as 
much as the adult population as a whole).1
Ipsos MORI (2017b) and YouGov (2017a) estimated increases in 
youth turnout in 2017 of 15 percentage points and 16 percentage points, 
to 54% and 59% respectively. The Essex Continuous Monitoring Survey 
(Whiteley and Clarke 2017) estimated an increase of around 20 points. 
Although these figures have (in our view, unjustly) been challenged by a 
British Election Study report (Prosser et al. 2018), it is clear that 18–24 
year olds voted at rates not seen since the early 1990s (Curtice and 
Simpson 2018). Given the weakening of party allegiances and decline in 
party membership over several decades, and the low levels of trust in poli-
ticians and political parties, the increase in youth turnout rates in 2017 
was a seismic event.
The election also revealed a stark intergenerational divide in voter 
choice  – so much so that YouGov (2017a) pronounced that age had 
replaced class as ‘the new dividing line in British politics’. The gap in 
 support for the two main parties amongst 18–24 year olds – 35 percentage 
points – was unprecedented in size. Nearly two thirds (62%) of this cohort 
voted Labour and only 27% voted Conservative, compared to 61% of over 
65s who voted Conservative and just 25% who voted Labour (Ipsos 
MORI 2017b). Labour enjoyed a majority over the Conservative Party in 
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every age group under 45. The highest levels of support came from young 
women (73%), and young people of a low social grade (70%). The Labour 
Party also garnered the support of a large majority of Black and Minority 
Ethnic voters (73%), who have a younger age profile than the majority 
white population.2
Chapter 5 begins with an analysis of the 2017 UK General Election 
campaign. It examines young people’s consumption of political news, as 
well as the extent to which the main political parties sought to appeal to 
younger citizens through their manifestos and communication strategies. 
We pay particular attention to efforts to appeal to young people through 
social media. Afterwards, we investigate the nature of youth turnout in 
2017, and provide evidence to support the conclusion that there was a 
surge in youth participation. The next section explores the spectacular 
increase in youth support for the Labour Party in more detail, studying 
the intergenerational and intragenerational aspects of this sea-change in 
voter choice. Finally, we turn to the policy dimension of the election – 
identifying the key issues that were prioritised by younger citizens. Here, 
we illustrate the similarities between young Labour voters and those young 
people who voted Remain in the EU referendum.
Political Parties and the Mobilization of Young 
Voters
Election manifestos provide a unique insight into the electoral strategies 
and demographic target groups of political parties (Laver and Garry 
2000). In 2017, it was clear from the outset that the Labour Party, the 
Liberal Democrats and the Green Party made a concerted effort to engage 
with younger members of the electorate. The Labour Party (2017) mani-
festo articulated a vision for improving living standards through a number 
of key policy proposals. They included addressing the increasingly unaf-
fordable costs of housing (for instance, through the introduction of rent 
controls for the private sector), reversing the abolition of housing benefit 
for 18–21 year olds, the abolition of university tuition fees, and the ban-
ning of zero-hour contracts.3 The manifesto devoted 426 words (1.77% of 
its 24,019 word manifesto to specific pledges to young people, compared 
to just 88 words (or 0.29%) of the 2001 document (see Chap. 3). The 
Labour Party had taken tentative steps to addressing youth issues in the 
run-up to the 2015 General Election – promising to get rid of most unpaid 
 YOUTHQUAKE: YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE 2017 GENERAL ELECTION 
94
apprenticeships, abolish zero-hour contracts, deliver votes at 16, and 
reduce university tuition fees to £6,000 – but they did not play as central 
a role in the actual campaign.
The Liberal Democrats (2017) tied the future well-being of young 
people to the country’s uncertain future surrounding Brexit and its rela-
tionship with the European Union. The Liberal Democrat manifesto also 
pledged to spend more on young people’s mental health, to promote 
environmental protection, and to reverse housing benefit cuts for 18–21 
year olds. However, other than on the subject of housing benefits, the 
Liberal Democrat manifesto remained vague on the details of its youth- 
oriented policies, providing only 54 words (0.233% of the document) – 
regarding retaining opportunities for young people to work, study and 
travel abroad – that were specifically dedicated to younger citizens. The 
Green Party’s (2017) bespoke ‘youth manifesto’ promised to restore the 
Educational Maintenance Allowance, reinstate housing benefits for those 
aged under 21, scrap university tuition fees, tackle the nation’s ‘housing 
crisis’ and protect the environment.4 Despite making a pitch for the youth 
vote, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens were ultimately matched in 
the Labour Party’s ‘For The Many, Not The Few’ manifesto. Thus, the 
appeal of the Labour Party and Jeremy Corbyn to younger voters resulted 
in a lack of progress for the Liberal Democrat Party (preventing any 
rebound after the disintegration of their support amongst young people in 
2015) and the Greens. For the Liberal Democrats, we would argue that 
the relative appeal (to young people) of their continued support of EU 
membership was effectively cancelled out by their perceived lack of credi-
bility on issues such as public services, higher education, and austerity 
more generally (given their participation in the 2010–2015 Coalition 
Government).
The Conservative Party’s (2017) prescriptions for young people were 
largely a restatement of existing policies, such as efforts to boost youth 
employment and apprenticeships. The manifesto only devoted 45 words 
(0.147%) to youth-oriented policies, referring only to 200,000 appren-
ticeship places already created, and a commitment to intergenerational 
justice through reforms to payments for social care for the elderly. There 
was hardly any direct engagement with the key youth issues mentioned 
above. The strategy was, instead, geared towards attracting older, Leave 
supporters, many of whom had voted for UKIP in 2015. And, in this aim, 
the party was very successful. As a consequence, the Conservative Party’s 
efforts to improve intergenerational inequalities through the increased use 
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of means-testing of social care for the elderly – derided in the media as the 
‘dementia tax’ – and the removal of the ‘triple lock’ on pensions were not 
articulated as policies that would benefit young people (even though they 
appeared to have the potential to re-balance resources in favour of younger 
citizens).5 And, in the face of internal resistance and opposition from older 
voters and traditional allies in the media, the so-called dementia tax was 
jettisoned during the heat of the campaign. The Conservative Party’s lack 
of focus on youth affairs was not inevitable. In 2015, the party addressed 
young people more directly through policies such as the help-to-buy 
scheme for young first-time buyers.
Labour’s manifesto policy pledges managed to achieve two crucial 
objectives when it came to young people. They made the Conservatives 
appear out-of-touch with their main grievances and concerns, and they 
prevented the party from being outgunned by other progressive parties on 
youth issues. The Labour Party adopted policies that had clear appeal to 
younger voters: from university tuition fees, to the proposed public invest-
ment in social housing. And, since young people viewed healthcare as the 
most important issue facing the country, Labour’s historic ownership of 
public services issues and Jeremy Corbyn’s passionate anti-privatisation 
stance on the NHS also placed the party at a major advantage amongst this 
demographic.
Labour’s success in attracting younger voters during the campaign was 
underlined by its increasing support in the opinion polls. Only four months 
before the 2017 General Election, the Labour Party’s lead over the 
Conservatives amongst 18–24 year olds was only 41–23% (18 points) 
(Ipsos MORI 2017a), compared to 35 points in the actual result. And, for 
around a quarter of Labour supporters (of all ages) the party’s manifesto 
as the most important reason for voting Labour (YouGov 2017b). This 
was not the case for older Labour supporters.
We know, therefore, that the Labour manifesto was successful in appeal-
ing to younger voters. But what role did their communications strategy 
play in reaching out to this demographic group? In our Populus poll, we 
explored how younger citizens consumed news about the election. It is 
well known that young people are increasingly using online and social 
media sources to gather news about politics, and to share this news and 
their own opinions with other young people. But the extent of the inter-
generational differences was unexpected. We found that online news was 
the most popular source of information for young people: over half (56%) 
of 18–24 year olds consumed news through sources such as BBC Online 
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or Buzzfeed, compared to 40% of all age groups, and 28% of over 65s 
(Fig. 5.1). Social media was the second most common way of gathering 
political news for nearly half (48%) of young people, compared to 22% of 
all age groups, and 6% of over 65s. TV news continues to be a common 
source of information, but this is much less the case for Young Millennials: 
48% of 18–24 year olds watched TV news, compared to 66% of all age 
groups, and 85% of over 65s. Finally, it is now quite rare for young people 
to read the print versions of newspapers: only 9% of 18–24 year olds, com-
pared to 24% of all age groups, and 40% of over 65s.
It is, therefore, clear that traditional forms of political communication 
are less likely to appeal to, or be heard by, younger voters. The continuing 
rise of new styles and methods of political communication and news con-
sumption had important implications for political parties and their cam-
paign strategies in 2017.
The Labour Party was more effective at communicating its messages to 
younger voters in 2017. We might have expected Labour to dominate in 
the digital sphere, given the young, left-leaning profile of social media 
users. But, as we explained in the previous chapter, it was actually the 
Leave campaigns that dominated this sphere during the referendum cam-
paign in 2016. Boosted by his celebrity endorsements and the emergence 
of left-leaning, online news platforms such as The Canary, Jeremy Corbyn 
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achieved about three times as many Facebook likes (1.4 million) and 
Twitter followers (1.42 million) as Theresa May (Fig.  5.2). Moreover, 
Corbyn, unlike May, was more popular than his party (by 400,000 
Facebook likes and almost a million Twitter followers). This was made 
possible by Corbyn’s personal appeal to young Labour supporters. A 
quarter (24%) of young Labour supporters (compared to only 10% of 
Labour supporters aged over 25) cited his leadership as their main reason 
for voting for the party (YouGov 2017b). Conversely, Theresa May’s lead-
ership was cited by just 4% of young party supporters (and 5% of those 
over 25) as their main reason for voting Conservative.
The Labour social media strategy – pioneered during Corbyn’s party 
leadership bid by the grass-roots campaign group, Momentum – provided 
an effective means of reaching out to younger voters through attractive, 
interactive content (Fletcher 2017; Lilleker 2017; Pickard 2018). 
Subsequent Buzzfeed analysis found that only one of the top twenty 
“liked” election stories on Facebook was negative about Labour or Corbyn 
(Waterson 2017). The top two stories were ‘How many of Jeremy 
Corbyn’s Policies do You Actually Disagree With?’ and ‘A Guide to Anti- 
Conservative Tactical Voting’.
Momentum utilised cutting-edge knowledge of political mobilization – 
some of this learnt from the Bernie Sanders’ campaign for the Democratic 
Party Nomination for the US presidency in 2016, including through the 
direct involvement of Sanders activists (BBC, 7 August, 2017) – to engage 
with young people. One example was the use of texts rather than emails to 
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mobilise voters. Momentum claimed that it had contacted an estimated 
400,000 people through WhatsApp, the messaging service, on election 
day. This emphasizes the fact that the Momentum and the Labour cam-
paign strategies involved a combination of both online and offline engage-
ment, including online contacts and information sharing alongside offline 
meetups or activism. The existing literature shows that online interactions 
are most effective when coupled with engagement in the real world 
(Chadwick 2017).
Labour’s ability to appeal to younger voters was in large part enabled 
by the structural changes to the party that had been put in place under 
the leadership of Ed Miliband (2010–2015). The Miliband team, 
through their ‘Refounding Labour: A Party for the New Generation’ 
reform programme explicitly sought to appeal to new, younger mem-
bers. These reforms and the entry into the party of new £3 ‘registered 
supporters’ swelled the membership, and encouraged the ‘horizontal 
social movement’ style of mobilisation (attractive to younger citizens) 
utilized by Momentum in the 2015 Corbyn leadership bid and the 2017 
General Election (Pickard 2018). With regard to communicating 
Labour’s message to young voters, Corbyn proved to be an adept per-
former both in person and through social media. The perception of the 
Labour leader as authentic and principled allowed him to tap into social 
networks, and channels of communication not open to other leaders. 
Which other politician (in 2017 or in earlier decades) would have been 
greeted with cheers at the Glastonbury music festival or could have 
drawn support from the Grime music scene? The brave decision of 
Corbyn and his campaign team to appear at Glastonbury also demon-
strated that actively courting the youth vote had become a central plank 
of Labour’s election strategy.
In 2015, Ed Miliband had attempted to engage more actively (than 
previous Labour leaders) with a younger audience – notably through 
his broadcast interview and discussion with actor and comedian, Russell 
Brand – but lacked the ability to connect with younger voters when 
compared to his successor. It should nevertheless be noted that 
Corbyn’s efforts to appeal to young people, whilst addressing youth 
issues, also contained elements of a populist appeal to emotions and 
simplistic notions of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ and ‘them’ (political and eco-
nomic elites) and ‘us’ (Flinders 2018). This was something that 
Miliband, with his more intellectual brand of social democracy could 
never have achieved.
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turning out
We explained in the introduction and Chap. 2 how youth participation in 
elections in the UK declined dramatically after the late 1990s, falling to 
the lowest levels in Western Europe – an average of around 20 percentage 
points below the turnout rate for 18–24 year olds in France, 30 percent-
age points below Germany, and over 40 points below Sweden.
In 2017, the situation changed radically. According to Ipsos MORI 
(2017b) data, the participation of 18–24 year olds rose 15 percentage 
points to 54% – from 39% in 2015 and a low of 37% in 2005 (Fig. 5.3). 
Although, as we will discuss later in the chapter, there was some contro-
versy over the youth turnout figures, there is general agreement  – as 
argued in the British Social Attitudes study  – that youth turnout had 
returned to the levels of the early 1990s (Curtice and Simpson 2018). 
Ipsos MORI data (2017b) suggest that 2017 witnessed a youth surge 
rather than a general increase in electoral participation. Figure 5.3 shows 
that the increase in turnout was confined to younger cohorts – 18–24 year 
olds and 25–34 year olds. By contrast, electoral participation in all other 
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age groups showed no significant change. So, the difference between the 
estimated participation of 18–24 year olds and the estimated participation 
of all citizens shrank from 22 points in 2015 to 9 points in 2017. And, the 
ratio of participation (of younger to older voters) returned to a similar 
level to those found in other established democracies (Fig. 1.2, Chap. 1). 
Youth turnout in 2017 remained 17 percentage points below the turnout 
rates for over 55s, but is almost identical to the rate of participation for 
those aged 25–44 and 35–44.
It should not be forgotten that there are some important intra- 
generational differences in voting patterns. Socio-economic status had a 
major bearing on levels of electoral participation amongst Young 
Millennials. Youth turnout was dependent upon a young person’s social 
grade and educational status (Fig. 5.4). A large majority (61%) of 18–34 
year olds of a high social grade (AB) and 64% of 18–34 year olds of an 
above average social grade (C1) voted, compared to only 49% of 18–34 
year olds of a below average social grade (C2) and just 35% of those of a 
low social grade (DE). As expected, full-time students (67%) were also 
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much more likely (by 13 percentage points) to turn out to vote than the 
average young person. Black minority ethnic citizens of all ages were sig-
nificantly less likely to vote than the average UK citizen. However, this can 
largely be explained by the composition of BME citizens, who are gener-
ally younger and less well-off than the general population (Sanders et al. 
2014). Gender appeared to have no discernible effect on electoral partici-
pation in 2017.
So, the estimated turnout gap between young people and all citizens is 
very small or reversed with respect to young people of an above average or 
high social grade and full-time students. The problem, more precisely 
defined, is the non-participation of young people from poorer 
backgrounds.
It is, obviously, too early to say whether 2017 was a watershed, where a 
new generation of young people became engaged in electoral politics or 
simply a one-off. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Labour Party was con-
siderably more successful in mobilizing young people in 2017 than in 
previous polls.
turning left
One of the most prominent features of the 2017 General Election was the 
importance of age in predicting which party an individual voted for. A 
remarkable 62% of 18–24 year olds voted for the Labour Party, contrast-
ing with only 27% for the Conservative Party (Ipsos MORI 2017b). 
During the period from October 1974 to 2017, the gap in support for the 
two parties amongst young people recorded at the 2017 General Election – 
35 percentage points  – was unprecedented in size (Fig. 5.5). The next 
largest gap during this period was 22 points in 1997. The swing to Labour 
in 2017 reverberated down the generations. The Labour Party’s 2017 
lead over the Conservatives was 29 points amongst 25–34 year olds and 
16 points amongst 35–44 year olds. Thus, the youthquake extended 
beyond the youngest cohort of voters.
It is common to assume that the Labour Party is always more popular 
amongst younger voters, but this is not the case. In 2015, 18–24 year olds 
supported Labour over the Conservatives by 42–28%, a gap of only 14 points. 
In 2010, the two large parties were locked together with the Liberal 
Democrats on approximately 30% support from the youngest electoral 
cohort. We would highlight the significance of the 2015 General Election 
in that the Labour Party managed to improve its performance amongst 
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18–24 year olds by 11 percentage points, thanks largely to the implosion of 
the Liberal Democrat youth vote (from 30% to 4% as a result of the party’s 
participation in the Coalition Government and U-turn on university tuition 
fees). It should also be noted that, in 2015, the Green Party also benefitted 
considerably from the decline in Liberal Democrat support amongst this 
demographic.
Labour’s astonishing success in 2017 amongst younger citizens was 
achieved through small gains from the Conservative Party, the large-scale 
capture of voters from third parties, and by mobilising more young people 
to vote. The Liberal Democrat Party failed to improve on its disastrous 
performance in 2015. Although it did not suffer any further decline in its 
share of the 18–24 year old vote in 2017, the fact that it was not able to 
regain some of its losses in this age group was a major disappointment 
given the strong pro-European theme of its manifesto. What is more, 
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tactical voting and a surge in student support for Labour, led to damaging 
defeats for Liberal Democrat incumbents in the university constituencies 
of Sheffield Hallam (Nick Clegg), and Leeds North West (Greg 
Mulholland). An underreported feature of the youth vote was the large 
gain in Labour support from the Green Party, whose share of the youth 
vote fell from 8% in 2015 to just 2% in 2017. The emergence of Corbyn 
as an anti-establishment figure with cosmopolitan-left credentials, and the 
perceived lack of importance of the environment as an issue (as discussed 
below) squeezed support for the environmental party.
The Labour Party’s emphatic lead amongst 18–24 year olds varied 
across different groups of young people (Fig. 5.6). It gained greatest 
support from young women (73%), and young people of a low social 
grade (70%). Labour also secured the backing of 73% of Black and 
Ethnic Minority citizens, who have a younger age profile that the aver-
age UK  citizen.6 Whilst we might expect, from previous elections, social 
grade and student status to have a large impact on party support, the 
scale of the Labour Party’s appeal amongst young women was surprising 
given that there was no difference between men and women’s support 
for Labour and the  Conservatives amongst adults of all ages. These 
results might be attributed to the Brexit effect – 75% of young Remainers 
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voted Labour in 2017 (ICM 2017b) – and to the Corbyn effect. Young 
women, students and BME citizens were all very likely to vote Remain, 
and to sympathise with the Labour leader’s views on economic inequal-
ity, immigration and British foreign policy. On the other hand, the 
weaker support for Labour (52%) and stronger support for the 
Conservatives (36%) amongst young men may in part be attributed to 
their higher than average levels of Euroscepticism.
The influence of socio-economic status on voting intention has become 
more complex. In 2017, young people of a high social grade were more 
likely to support Labour than the Conservatives (by 52–31%), but to a 
smaller degree than the average 18–24 year old (a Labour lead of 35 per-
centage points). However, full-time students were considerably more 
likely to vote Labour than Conservative (by 64–19%). Attention should be 
drawn to some notable differences between young Remain voters in 2016 
and young Labour voters in 2017. Labour scored better than the Remain 
campaign amongst young people of a low social grade (by 70–54%), but 
worse amongst young students (by 64–82%).
Despite the overwhelming extent of youth support for Labour in 2017, 
the narrative of the party’s appeal to young voters must be treated with 
some caution. Youth support for Labour appeared to be highly dependent 
upon Corbyn’s leadership, and as such might be viewed as a protest vote 
against: the political establishment in general, the economically precarious 
position of the Millennial generation, and the authoritarian-nationalist 
populism of Nigel Farage, Donald Trump and elements of the Leave cam-
paign. It is very uncertain as to whether this youth support for Labour 
would transfer to a less anti-establishment party leader, or whether youth 
support for Labour might ebb away the further removed we become from 
the trauma of the financial crisis and the memory of the Brexit 
referendum.
the PolicY Priorities of Young Millennials
To better understand why young people overwhelmingly voted for 
Labour, we need to take a closer look at party policy and the issues priori-
tised by younger cohorts. Figure 5.7 indicates the policy preferences of 
young people (18–24 year olds) compared to the average UK citizen, and 
those aged over 65. According to Lord Ashcroft polling, the ‘most impor-
tant single issue’ for young people during the election campaign was 
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healthcare, which was chosen by 27% of this cohort. The NHS, a tradi-
tional strength for the Labour Party, was earmarked for extra funding in 
its 2017 manifesto. The next priority for young people was Brexit (15% of 
younger citizens prioritized this policy area). Here, younger voters were 
also more closely aligned to the official Labour position, which – though 
lacking in detail – advocated a ‘soft Brexit’ through the maintenance of 
close relations with the Single Market. Though Brexit was a key issue for 
young people, it was viewed as similarly important to a number of materi-
alist issues.
The third most important area for 18–24 year olds was that of austerity, 
poverty and economic inequalities (13%). This was followed by education 
(10%), and the economy and jobs (8%). In our Populus poll, ‘housing’ 
also emerged as a key theme for young people.7 Whilst many of these 
issues may be long-term problems that have persisted for several decades, 
the polls suggested that young people associated austerity, economic 
inequalities and the increasingly unaffordable costs of housing with seven 
years of Conservative-led government.
Perceptions of the importance of different issues varied greatly across 
generations. The differences between young and old were largest on the 
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subjects of Brexit (−23 percentage points), the NHS (+14 points), 
 education (+9 points), austerity, cuts and inequalities (+7 points), and 
immigration and asylum (−5 points). Adults of all ages considered Brexit 
(alongside the NHS) to be the top issue facing the country, and it was eas-
ily the most important issue for those over 65. The cosmopolitan-left atti-
tudes and sentiments of Young Millennials, thus, diverged remarkably 
from those of the over 65s. This related not just to their policy priorities, 
but also to the positions adopted on the issues. This was particularly the 
case with regard to the political-cultural issues of Brexit and immigration, 
where young people were much more supportive of membership of the 
European Union and were much less concerned about immigration to the 
UK (see Chap. 4).
Using an ICM (2017c) poll of 1,002 18–24 year olds fielded a week 
before the election, we were able to examine the policy priorities of young 
people in more depth, with respect to age within the cohort, gender, social 
grade, student status, support for Labour or Conservatives in 2017, and 
support for Remain or Leave in the 2016 referendum. Figure 5.8 illus-
trates the large differences that existed between young women and young 
men on the relative importance of the NHS (prioritised by 66% of young 
women and only 44% of young men) and Brexit (prioritised by 31% of 
young men and only 21% of young women). This, again, illustrates why 
young women were much more likely to vote Labour than young men. 
The differences between 18–21 year olds and all 18–24 year olds over 
their prioritization of materialist issues were less surprising; for instance, 
the younger group were more concerned about university tuition fees 
whilst the older group were more focused upon jobs and housing.
The similarities between the policy priorities of young Labour support-
ers and young Remainers (and between young Conservatives and young 
Leavers) was remarkable. This provides further evidence for claims about 
the emergence of a distinct, cosmopolitan-left political constituency. The 
divide between young Labour and young Conservative supporters (and 
young Remainers and young Leavers) was unambiguous on a number of 
issues. The NHS was viewed as one of the most important issues by 58% 
of young Labour supporters and 60% of young Remainers, and by only 
40% of young Conservatives and 38% of young Leavers (a gap of around 
20 percentage points for both). Tuition fees were prioritised by 31% of 
young Labour and 23% of the pro-EU young Remainers, and only 4% of 
young Conservatives and 16% of young Leavers. On the other hand, 
young Conservatives and young Leavers were much more likely to stress 
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the importance of immigration (23% and 22%, respectively) than young 
Labour and young Remainers (4% for both).
It is also important to point out, again, that the prioritisation of par-
ticular issues by different sub-groups of young people does not mean that 
they were supportive of the same policy solutions. For example, there was 
little difference between the policy priorities of the highest and the lowest 
social grades and between these social grades and full-time students, but 
this masked large differences in support for or opposition to cultural diver-
sity and European integration (see Chap. 4).
the Youthquake debate
Estimating voter turnout amongst sub-groups of the population is fraught 
with difficulties. It can be measured as a proportion of the population and 
as a percentage of registered voters. The former is preferred by most polit-
ical scientists. However, citizens are often reluctant to admit (in opinion 
polls) that they did not participate in an election due to the perceived 
social desirability of voting. So, we have to rely on best estimates of 
turnout.
With regard to youth turnout in 2017, the British Election Study (BES) 
reported that there was no significant increase in the electoral participa-
tion of 18–24 year olds in 2017. And, on this basis, described the youth-
quake as a ‘myth’ or a mere ‘tremor’ (Prosser et al. 2018).8 We disagree 
with this characterisation of the youthquake for a number of reasons. 
Despite its highly regarded methodology, the BES results were based on a 
very small sample of young people, which makes the weighting of the data 
all the more important.9 We agree with Stewart et al. (2018), who raise 
concerns about the large differences between the BES unweighted and 
weighted data of 18–24 year olds (63% and 49.6%, respectively).
Other pollsters, using much larger samples of young people, estimated 
considerable increases in youth turnout in 2017. Ipsos MORI (2017b), 
sampling 890 18–24 year olds, recorded an increase in youth turnout of 
15 points to 54%.10 YouGov (2017a), sampling 3,756 18–24 year olds, 
estimated an increase of 16 points to 59%. The New Musical Express (9 
June, 2017) poll, sampling 1,354 18–24 year olds, recorded an increase of 
12 points to 56%. And, if we look at the differences in estimates of support 
for the Conservative and Labour parties between polling companies, they 
were largely founded on different estimates of youth turnout. As ICM (5 
June 2017a) argued: ‘those pollsters who, like us, show higher Tory leads 
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are implicitly sceptical about the extent of this self-reported turnout’ 
amongst young people. Yet it was those pollsters like ICM, who predicted 
a lower youth turnout, that underestimated the vote for Labour on 8 June. 
Meanwhile pollsters such as YouGov, who predicted a higher youth turn-
out, proved to be more accurate in forecasting the actual result.
More generally, to dismiss the so-called youthquake as a myth is to take 
a very narrow view about what constitutes political engagement and polit-
ical change. Even if we presume that turnout amongst 18–24 year olds did 
not increase (which is disputed by much of the polling data), we would 
point to several other changes that have reshaped the political landscape. 
These include the unprecedented rate of youth support for the Labour 
Party, high levels of youth activism in the campaign (Pickard 2018), and 
the distinctive cosmopolitan values of young Labour supporters. To argue 
that young people did not significantly influence the election result 
(Prosser et al. 2018), by focussing exclusively on 18–24 year olds, misun-
derstands how generational change influences politics. The dramatic 
events we discuss above were most evident with the youngest cohort of 
voters, but – as we explain – were to a lesser extent present in all cohorts 
aged below 45.
The 2017 General Election marked both a long-term generational 
effect and a short-term period effect on the values and political habits of 
Young Millennials growing up in the aftermath of the financial crisis and 
through their experiences of the 2016 EU referendum. When one looks 
into the intragenerational dimensions of the youth vote, the changes in 
2017 were remarkable. The cosmopolitan-left attitudes and orientations 
of young people are particularly present amongst young students and 
young women.
Clearly not all young people could be considered as participants or fel-
low travellers in this cosmopolitan-left movement, and it is much less 
reflective of young white men from poorer backgrounds with low levels of 
educational attainment. Indeed, our research identifies a significant minor-
ity of young people who were likely to vote for Brexit in 2016 and the 
Conservative Party in 2017, and who harboured deep reservations about 
immigration and ethnic diversity.
We argue that a youthquake equates to much more than voter turnout, 
and should be seen as a multi-faceted phenomenon involving fundamental 
social, political and cultural shifts. It is worth re-stating that the OED 
defined a youthquake as ‘a significant cultural, political, or social change 
arising from the actions or influence of young people’.
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Finally, the narrative effects of the youthquake should not be dis-
missed out of hand. We would argue that the widespread acceptance that 
a youthquake happened had a tangible impact on the behaviour of the 
national political parties. Corbyn’s deliberate targeting of the youth 
vote, Labour’s unusually high dependency upon youth activists, and the 
unexpectedly strong performance of Labour in the election, encouraged 
the Conservative Party to rethink its approach to younger voters. This 
shaped a review of – amongst other things – the role of young people 
within the party as well as policy on tuition fees and housing benefits for 
18–21 year olds.
suMMarY
In 2017, younger voters were politically energised by Brexit and Jeremy 
Corbyn’s Labour Party. In an echo of the 1960s, they expressed them-
selves as left-of-centre cosmopolitans, reacting both to austerity politics 
and to the cultural conservatism found in older generations and embodied 
by the Leave campaign in the EU referendum.
In 2017, age replaced class as the key predictor of party choice. This 
emanated from the emergence of cosmopolitan-left attitudes amongst 
many Young Millennials, and the sense of collective political identity 
established within this group through their experiences of protest (for 
example, Occupy and the student tuition fee demonstrations), the 2016 
EU referendum, and the 2017 General Election. The large intergenera-
tional differences in political attitudes have been driven by the redistri-
bution of resources away from younger citizens and youth-oriented 
public policy since the advent of the global financial crisis in 2008, and 
in opposition to the cultural backlash of older generations against the 
issues of diversity, European integration, and immigration. Despite his 
lukewarm approach to the European Union, Corbyn’s opposition to 
austerity appealed to many younger voters, as did his internationalist 
outlook and his acceptance of immigration and cultural diversity. In the 
2017 General Election and the 2016 EU referendum, support for the 
Labour Party and Remain was therefore particularly strong amongst citi-
zens who were young, highly educated, female and supportive of cul-
tural diversity.
Young people were attracted to Corbyn’s perceived authenticity and 
policy program, but this was a two-way street. The Labour Party appealed 
directly to this demographic through proposed investments in education 
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and housing, and by guaranteeing workers’ rights. By contrast, there was 
little for young people in the Conservative Party manifesto beyond vague 
references to intergenerational justice. Conversely, we can conclude that 
the (successful) pursuit of UKIP voters by the Conservative Party (with 
regard to positions in favour of a ‘hard Brexit’ and reducing immigration) 
were naturally repellent to many younger voters.
After the election, the Conservative Party recognised ‘the need to win 
over young voters’ (Damian Green, BBC Online, 1 July 2017), and in 
2018 appointed two vice-chairs of the party with the specific task of 
improving its standing amongst younger citizens. In spring 2018, the 
Conservatives also launched Onward, a think-tank to be spearheaded by 
(amongst others) Ruth Davidson, the young, socially liberal and pro-EU 
Scottish Conservative leader with the express intention of ‘enticing 
younger voters away from Jeremy Corbyn to the Conservatives’ (The 
Times, 18 April 2018).
It is clear that the Labour Party – particularly its leader Jeremy Corbyn – 
dominated a social media space where political information is well-trusted 
and relatively highly consumed by Britain’s young people. The party cer-
tainly enjoyed a comfortable advantage over the Conservative Party on 
this front. This led to Conservatives, such as Robert Halfon, a former 
Minister for Education, to argue for a Tory-affiliated version of Momentum, 
to counter Labour’s ownership of the digital sphere. Speaking to City AM, 
Halfon dismissed Tory grassroots infrastructure as ‘either ageing or non- 
existent’ (Sloam and Ehsan 2017).
The higher youth turnout in 2017 showed that young people can be 
mobilised if politicians address the issues they care about with concrete 
policy proposals. On the other hand, the engagement also reflected 
 disillusionment and anger with the impact of public policy on younger 
generations in the aftermath of the financial crisis and actualised in gov-
ernment austerity programmes during the 2010–2015 and the 
2015–2017 Parliaments. Furthermore, our findings show that we should 
also continue to pay attention to low electoral participation amongst 
certain groups of young people – particularly those of a low social grade, 
not in education or with low levels of educational attainment. In the 
UK, there is also the additional issue of voter registration. With the 
introduction of Individual Voter Registration in 2014, over a million 
citizens (disproportionately young people) fell off the electoral roll 
(James and Sidorcsuk 2016).
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notes
1. We disagree with the claims of Curtice and Simpson (2018) and others 
that political interest did not increase amongst young people during and 
after the referendum. If one asks questions about political interest per se 
that might be true (reflecting a continued dissatisfaction with politics and 
politicians amongst young people). But if one asks questions about interest 
in the campaign, that is not the case.
2. Unfortunately, in our polling data, the sample size for young BME citizens 
was not large enough to be reliable – particularly when separated out into 
different ethnic minority sub-groups (such as social class and so on).
3. Other youth-oriented policies set out in the Labour Party manifesto 
included: greater investment in early stage intervention in young people’s 
mental health, and the creation of a justice system to help re-integrate 
youth offenders back into society
4. Due to the separate Green manifestos produced for different groups of 
citizens, it was impossible to compare their focus on young people to the 
three main parties.
5. It should be noted that, in what many considered to be a populist move, 
the Labour Party positioned itself as opposing these Conservative propos-
als for the reform of social care for the relatively well-off elderly, whilst at 
the same time advocating increased spending on youth-oriented issues, 
including the abolition of university tuition fees.
6. We were not able to acquire large enough samples of young BME voters to 
include them in this study. However, we would have expected to find con-
siderable support for the Labour Party from this group, given Jeremy 
Corbyn’s active engagement with ethnic minority groups (for example, 
Grime4Corbyn), and his critical views of British foreign policy in the 
Middle East, the Prevent de-radicalisation programme, and police target-
ing of young ethnic minority citizens for stop-and-search (The Independent, 
30 May 2017).
7. ‘Housing’ was not classified as a separate category in the Lord Ashcroft 
Polling (2017) data.
8. The authors of the BES report claimed that there was no surge in electoral 
turnout amongst 18–24 year olds and that the youth vote (due to its 
numerical size if nothing else) did not swing the election (Prosser et al. 
2018).
9. We would note that the small BES sample size of 18–24 year olds did not 
(or could not) address the voting patterns of distinct sub-groups of young 
people (such as young women, young people in full-time education or 
geographical variations in youth voting patterns).
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10. It is worth noting that, under Ipsos MORI’s pre-2017 ‘percent of all resi-
dent adults’ methodology, the increase in turnout was even higher – over 
20 percentage points. The figures we use for 2010 and 2015 draw upon 
this old methodology, whilst the figures we use for 2017 are based on the 
new methodology (‘percent of all registered voters’). So, if anything, we 
believe that we are presenting a conservative estimate of the increase in 
youth turnout.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion
Recent trends across a wide range of contemporary advanced post- 
industrial societies suggest that there is an ongoing – and deepening – dis-
connect between citizens and democratic politics and institutions (Norris 
2011). This plays itself out in different ways in different contexts, but 
what is common to many is that this disaffection is epitomised by declin-
ing electoral participation rates, with people voting in far fewer numbers 
than was the case in previous decades. This was particularly evident at the 
2014 European Assembly elections. There, nearly 400 million Europeans 
in 28 countries were eligible to vote, yet only 43% opted to do so. This 
represented the lowest turnout rate since direct elections to the Assembly 
were first held in 1979 when 62 per cent of the electorate voted (European 
Parliament 2014).
Furthermore, where they do vote, significant numbers of people in 
many such countries are rejecting traditional and mainstream parties and 
elites, and choosing instead to vote for populist and anti-system parties, 
often of the emerging left or of the authoritarian-nationalist right (Della 
Porta 2006; Grimm and Pilkington 2015; Mudde 2010). For instance, in 
Britain, the anti-EU UKIP achieved first place at the 2014 European 
Assembly elections, scoring a notable victory over traditional Westminster 
parties; the Green Party (8%) pushed the Liberal Democrats – the tradi-
tional “third” party – into fifth place. Elsewhere, populist anti- immigration, 
nationalist and far-right parties made significant advances in countries like 
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Denmark (Danish People’s Party, first-place and 27%), France (Front 
National, first-place and 25%), Hungary (Jobbik, third-place and 20%), 
Greece (Golden Dawn, third-place and 9%). Meanwhile, relatively new 
leftist anti-system parties rejecting austerity and neoliberalism, scored 
impressive results in countries such as Greece (Syriza, first with 27%) and 
in Spain where PoDemos, which was founded just 6 months earlier, came 
fourth (8%). Many of these and other insurgent parties (such as “Pirate” 
parties in Iceland and elsewhere, the Five Star Movement in Italy) have 
repeated or even bettered these performances in national Parliamentary 
elections since, suggesting that the traditional political parties are vulner-
able to challenges from newer anti-establishment left, right and populist 
parties.
The strong performance of the Labour Party amongst younger voters 
in the 2017 UK General Election in one sense appeared to buck these 
trends. Young people had been drawn in droves to a mainstream political 
party of the centre-left. On the other hand, the success of Labour with this 
demographic also illustrated the continuing disillusionment of many 
young citizens with politicians and political parties. After all, this success 
was driven by the perception of Jeremy Corbyn as principled and authentic 
in contrast to the existing political establishment. And, Labour had been 
re-invented by Corbyn, with a youth-friendly and anti-austerity election 
manifesto and a mass-campaigning style that welcomed participation by 
grass-roots party members and the general public  – especially young 
people.
Youth and Political action
These trends of non-voting and of alternative voting are more a feature of 
the advanced post-industrial world now than was the case in earlier 
decades, and young people are not immune from the processes undermin-
ing citizens’ engagement with democratic institutions. This is the case 
across Europe but also in countries like Russia, Japan, Canada and the US 
(Dalton 2013; Sloam 2014; Stetsenko 2002). Indeed, as we have seen in 
this book, the disenchantment with the practice of contemporary politics 
and the distrust of political elites who are invested with the powers to 
conduct politics on behalf of the public, is particularly evident amongst 
young people – nowhere more so than in Britain. Throughout the years 
of the new Millennium, young Britons have, until very recently, been 
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noticeable by their absence from the polls. Their electoral turnout rates at 
UK Parliamentary elections in 2001, 2005, 2010 and 2015 were consid-
erably lower than was the case for older age groups within the electorate. 
Just as importantly, their abstention rate at these contests was significantly 
higher than it was for previous youth generations throughout the post-
War decades.
However, it is not only their rate of electoral participation that distin-
guishes young people from other citizens. There is a significant body of 
evidence suggesting that when compared with older adults, young people 
in the UK and in similar countries have a distinct lack of interest in parlia-
mentary and electoral politics and considerably lower levels of political 
knowledge. They also appear to be less satisfied with democracy, more 
critical of politicians, less likely to be politically active, have comparatively 
weaker commitments to political parties, and are less likely to be members 
of political organisations (Henn and Oldfield 2016).
A number of recent studies have suggested that young people’s rela-
tionship with politics is a complex one. Whilst many may have little inter-
est in ‘formal’ parliamentary politics, this does not signal a disengagement 
from all forms of politics. Instead, research indicates that contemporary 
youth often take part in many differing forms of political action such as 
demonstrations, boycotts, and direct action (Hooghe and Oser 2015; 
Melo and Stockemer 2014). These unconventional forms of youth politi-
cal action tend to be focused on single issue campaigns such as environ-
mental concerns, women’s rights, anti-war, as well as broader anti-capitalist 
movements such as the global Occupy phenomenon. They also pertain to 
issues that affect young people’s everyday lives, such as the youth move-
ment for tighter gun controls in the United States that was inspired by the 
survivors of the Parkland school shooting.
In many respects, such alternative styles of political action represent a 
rejection of traditional and ‘formal’ methods of parliamentary politics, 
which tend to be overly reliant on political parties which are considered to 
be too regimented and restrictive, and led by politicians who can’t always 
be trusted to do the right thing. Instead, these newer forms of politics 
tend to attract youth because they are grass-roots organisations which are 
more open to influence by individuals, and which have agendas which 
seem to young people to be much more relevant and achievable (Tormey 
2015).
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ExPlaining intragEnErational inEqualitiEs in Youth 
Politics
Importantly, in this book we have used original data from our own research 
that indicates quite clearly that these patterns of political engagement and 
political participation are not uniform. Just as we have observed intergen-
erational differences, we have also identified intragenerational variations. 
British youth are not a homogenous mass; their political behaviours, val-
ues, sentiments and aspirations differ and are often structured by such 
factors as their gender, ethnicity, social class and educational trajectory. 
Our analyses reveal that there exists a large group that includes especially 
young women, students and the highly educated who are particularly pre- 
disposed to postmaterialist values and are often drawn towards anti- 
austerity cosmopolitan-left politics. These particular young people can be 
contrasted with a smaller group of youth who are more likely to be male 
and of low socio-economic status and education level, and who are suscep-
tible to an anti-establishment, right-wing and xenophobic discourse and 
who incline towards authoritarian-nationalist populism.
Explanations offered for these differing and unequal patterns of politi-
cal (dis-)engagement and political participation are varied. A useful way to 
conceptualise these is offered by Hay (2007) who distinguishes Supply 
and Demand explanations. Supply-side accounts emphasise the failure of 
mainstream political parties and political elites to inspire and mobilise 
young people. Instead, today’s youth feel at best ignored by the political 
class and at worst victimised by Government austerity policies which have 
progressively favoured older citizens and impacted disproportionately 
harshly on the nation’s youth (Birch et al. 2013). These experiences have 
left young Britons feeling alienated by the actions of politicians in office 
(Henn and Foard 2014).
Demand–side explanations focus on the changing nature of contem-
porary society such as there has been a shift in values and culture which 
means that young people are increasingly critical of the practice of 
democracy and the behaviour and performance of those elected to 
office. This disenchantment is reinforced by a convergence of party 
programmes around neoliberal imperatives that fail to offer alternatives 
to austerity conditions and worsening prospects for today’s youth 
(Côté 2014). Frustrated by the practice and outcomes of mainstream 
democratic politics and the record of successive governments in office, 
many young people have become increasingly attracted to new – often 
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postmaterialist – political agendas and new styles of politics in a search 
for alternative ways to actualise their political aspirations.
The withdrawal of many young people from formal institutionalized 
politics and abstention from elections in 2001, 2005, 2010 and 2015 is 
not therefore indicative of a generalised youth apathy. On the contrary, it 
is our contention – empirically verified by the results of our recent stud-
ies – that for many young people, such elections held little appeal as they 
were considered to lack value in terms of providing meaningful solutions 
to the social and economic challenges faced by themselves and their peers.
thE YouthquakE
Young people are neither anti-democratic nor are they innately anti- 
election, and recent developments give grounds for optimism, suggesting 
that young people will engage with electoral politics and will vote if they 
feel that there is value in doing so. This is evidenced by the recent surge in 
young voters’ turnout at a number of recent electoral contests. For 
instance, the Electoral Commission estimates that 75% of newly enfran-
chised 16 and 17 year olds turned out to vote in the Scottish Independence 
Referendum in 2014, and as we have seen in Chap. 4, youth were particu-
larly prominent at the 2016 UK Referendum on EU membership (Ipsos 
MORI 2016). While the level of turnout of young people at the 2017 UK 
General Election is contested, we have presented a case in Chap. 5 that 
there was indeed a “youthquake”. This was evident in several respects, and 
particularly in terms of the overwhelming support of young people for 
Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour party, with its youth-oriented agenda and its new 
style of open and bottom-up politics that has given greater opportunities 
for the grass-roots to shape the party’s destiny. In some respects, this was 
made possible by the decision of former party leader Ed Miliband to open-
 up Labour to new members. Although this was viewed by many in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party as a mistake which ultimately propelled 
Corbyn to the leadership of the party and enabled his followers to gain 
ascendancy and a significant degree of power and control, it has also pro-
vided a democratic channel for youth politics.
What we have encountered in the data that informs the various chapters 
of this book is that the youthquake is not limited to this most recent 2017 
electoral contest. Instead, it is the culmination of processes that we have 
been gaining momentum since the landmark General Election of 2001 
when observers of electoral studies turned their gaze and attention to the 
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issue of electoral turnout rather than to the performance of the parties and 
the formal outcome in terms of composition of the new Government and 
balance of power in the House of Commons.
These processes include a change in outlook and culture of young peo-
ple. We have argued throughout this book that young Millennials are not a 
passive and apathetic generation of disinterested bystanders. On the con-
trary, even though they often abstained in large numbers at local, national 
and European Assembly elections between 2001 and 2015, our own data 
and the findings from studies published elsewhere indicate an ongoing 
interest in politics in general and in elections in particular (Henn and Foard 
2014; O’Toole 2015). They are also strong supporters of democracy 
(Cammaerts et al. 2014), but remain anxious that there exist only relatively 
few available opportunities for them to meaningfully participate in formal 
politics. Moreover, they consider that those who have been elected to public 
office on their behalf have failed to champion their issue- interests. As a con-
sequence of this, today’s generation of young people are engaged sceptics.
However, we have seen throughout the years of the new Millennium 
that there is a sizeable group of young people who have been attracted to 
a new style of politics and who prioritise an alternative politics agenda that 
is broadly postmaterialist in nature. They represent a new cosmopolitan- 
left group. We have identified these young people as having a solidaristic 
outlook and a deep concern for social justice. They emphasise the tackling 
of domestic and global inequalities as well as support for wealth redistribu-
tion. They are internationalist with a pro-European outlook and a toler-
ance of others from difference backgrounds. These young people are also 
critical of mainstream politics – and supporters of reforms that might reju-
venate democratic processes and institutions so that these become more 
open and accommodating to young citizens.
YouthquakE and a cultural Backlash?
The future and momentum of the youthquake remains uncertain. The 
emergence of the new left-cosmopolitan group of young people has a 
mirror-image in the appearance of an economically-insecure left-behind 
group of young people who don’t share the same progressive values. 
Inglehart and Norris (2016: 29) have characterised these two groups as 
having potentially diametrically opposed outlooks  – reflecting a new 
 cultural cleavage – so that the forward thrust of the youthquake that we 
have witnessed in recent years is by no means guaranteed:
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[T]he spread of progressive values has also stimulated a cultural backlash 
among people who feel threatened by this development. Less educated… citizens, 
especially white men, who were once the privileged majority culture in Western 
societies, resent being told that traditional values are ‘politically incorrect’ if 
they have come to feel that they are being marginalized within their own coun-
tries. As cultures have shifted, a tipping point appears to have occurred.
Indeed, the current economic, social, cultural and political environment is 
none too conducive for the advance of left-cosmopolitanism, and in some 
respects may be considered somewhat hostile. Inglehart’s thesis suggests 
that the spread of postmaterialist values is in large part contingent on the 
underlying economic circumstances in which young people are socialised; 
the ongoing global recession, austerity politics and rising economic 
inequality and insecurity potentially, therefore, present a major challenge 
to the proliferation of cosmopolitan, multicultural and progressive values. 
Furthermore, the continued absence of many young people from the 
polls, a first-past-the-post electoral system that works to the disadvantage 
of small progressive left-libertarian parties such as the Greens, and the 
prospect of Brexit, each contribute to these uncertainties and to the 
heightening of opportunities for a cultural backlash.
Nonetheless, the recent upturn in youth engagement witnessed in 
Britain at the 2016 EU referendum and the support for Corbyn’s Labour 
party at the 2017 General Election share common features with trends 
elsewhere internationally, and lend cause for optimism regarding the pros-
pect of further advances for left-cosmopolitanism in the future. These 
include young people’s participation in protest movements such as 
Occupy, the emergence of high profile and credible anti-establishment 
candidates and parties such as Sanders in the US and PoDemos in Spain, 
and the election to power of socially liberal leaders including Justin 
Trudeau in Canada and Jacinda Arden in New Zealand. Together, these 
developments offer young people alternative means and opportunities to 
address their fears and hopes in times of economic, political and social 
upheaval.
dEmocracY at a crossroads
Contemporary advanced post-industrial democracies are at a crossroads. 
In Britain, we have seen a youthquake in which young people have 
emerged on the electoral stage as key players exercising a collective power 
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that has demonstrated the capacity to shape the outcomes of electoral 
contests and the balance of power within the UK parliament. The Labour 
party did not win the 2017 General Election, but the mobilization of 
young people and their mass support for Corbyn’s Labour helped to deny 
the Conservatives the majority at Westminster that was expected, and 
which Prime Minister Theresa May considered necessary to achieve a 
strong and stable Government and a successful transition to Brexit.
However, the continued engagement of young people in British elec-
toral politics is not guaranteed, and neither is the spread of progressive 
democratic values. The natural process of generational replacement begs 
the question of which sentiments are carried on into later life by today’s 
youth? Will older cohorts be succeeded by a youth population instilled 
with authoritarian-nationalist values that promote division and conflict? 
Or will more positive values and sentiments associated with left- 
cosmopolitanism prevail, values that are typified by open-ness, tolerance, 
solidarity, social justice, and cooperation – where the goal is to extend and 
deepen democratic institutions, practices and processes?
These trajectories are critical. Brexit opens a new and uncertain chapter 
in the direction of UK democracy. The extent to which young people feel 
that their voice will be heard and that there will be meaningful opportuni-
ties for them to assert that voice and play an active role will shape whether, 
and how, they choose to engage with democracy and participate in demo-
cratic life. One of the rallying calls of those advocating a permanent Brexit 
was the notion that it would offer the opportunity for enhanced political 
sovereignty by the taking back of control from Europe to return political 
power to the public and provide the opportunity to rejuvenate UK democ-
racy. The Government and political parties have a role to play in harness-
ing the energies of youth in this process, of developing methods to reach 
out to young people and to work with them to help shape the renewal of 
UK democratic institutions and processes. If the political class is commit-
ted to this endeavour and successful in doing so, then the youthquake may 
be sustained and may progress in a positive direction that enhances and 
strengthens democracy and the spread of democratic values. If the political 
class fails to act in this decisive way, that will place a question mark over the 
course, stability and future of democracy, post-Brexit.
In this respect, education and political literacy are also pivotal in deter-
mining whether young people have the knowledge, skills and resources 
necessary to engage in democracy. We know that younger citizens claim to 
know less about how politics works than older generations. And, this is 
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particularly the case for young people from poorer backgrounds. And, the 
inequalities of participation within the generation of Young Millennials are 
disturbingly large. Clearly, political and social institutions need to do more 
to provide young people from these social groups with a reason to vote 
and the skills to do so. Here, we believe that schools and universities can 
play a central role – through the provision of citizenship education and 
opportunities for the practice of democratic skills – in scaffolding the tran-
sition of young people into adulthood.
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